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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits against gun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers have become
familiar sights on the judicial landscape. Recently, numerous lawsuits have been
brought by public entities, including cities, counties, and one state,' in an effort to
address the disturbing gun crime and injury statistics that have become an
unfortunate fact of life in the United States. For example, in 1997, gun-related
deaths in the United States were reported to be in excess of thirty-two thousand,2
with an additional sixty-four thousand serious injuries.3 In their suits against gun
sellers, public entities have alleged injuries ranging from interference with public
health and safety,4 to depletion of the public fisc,5 to creation of a hazardous
condition.6 The suits involve a constellation of different theories, ranging from
1. To date, the following public entities have filed suits against the gun industry: Los Angeles,
Compton, West Hollywood, & Englewood, CA; San Francisco, Berkeley, Sacramento, Oakland, East
Palo Alto, Alameda, and San Mateo County, CA; Bridgeport, CT; Washington, DC; Wilmington, DE;
Miami-Dade County, FL; Atlanta, GA; Chicago & Cook County, IL; Gary, IN; New Orleans, LA;
Boston, MA; Detroit, MI; Wayne County, MI; St. Louis, MO; Camden (both the city and the county),
NJ; Newark, NJ; New York City; New York State; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; and Philadelphia,
PA. The Violence Policy Center maintains an up-to-date web site that provides a useful chart containing
a list of complaints, filing dates, court, defendants, theories, and current status. One can also download
the complaints from that site. See Violence Policy Ctr., Litigation Against the Gun Industry, at
<http'//www.vpc.org/litigate.htm> (last visited Jan. 13, 2001).
2. Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data for 1997,47 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., June 30,
1999, at 68 tbl.16.
3. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nonfatal and
FatalFirearm-RelatedInjuries-United States, 1993-1997,48 MORBIDITY &MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
1029, 1031 (1999).
4. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Nov.
12, 1998) (order granting motion to dismiss entered Sept. 15, 2000); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. SUCV1999-02590-C (Mass. Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999) (order granting motion to dismiss
as to Count V entered July 13, 2000); City of St. Louis v. Cemicek, No. 992-01209 (Mo. Cir. Ct. filed
Apr. 30, 1999).
5. See, e.g., Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912-658 NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999)
(order granting motion to dismiss negligence cause of action entered May 16, 2000); City of Gary v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D05-005-CT-243 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 27, 1999) (order granting
motion to dismiss entered Jan. 12, 2001).
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public nuisance,' to negligence,' to product liability,9 to unfair and deceptive trade
and advertising practices.'
Predictably, political reaction to these lawsuits has been polarized. Those who
bemoan the abject failure of our national response to gun violence cheer these suits
as effecting an indirect, but nonetheless powerful, supplement to legislation. On the
other side stand antigun-control forces who regard these suits as cynical end-runs
around the democratic process. The blistering battery of parties and theories that
have been leveled against gun sellers feeds the critics' complaint that the suits are
less about recovery for injured parties or protection ofpublic safety and more about
achieving through litigation what cannot be achieved through the legislative route.
Of the various legal theories pressed into service by municipal entities" and
private plaintiffs alike, in suits against gun sellers, none has generated as much
puzzlement or negative reaction as that of public nuisance.' 2 To an extent, plaintiffs
and their allies have created their own problem. For example, Steven Young, a gun
control advocate from Chicago, lent legitimacy to the arguments of those who see
7. See, e.g., Complaint, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596); Complaint, City of Boston (No.
SUCV1999-02590-C); New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., No. 402586/2000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
June 26, 2000).
8. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99VS0149217J (State Ct. of Fulton
County filed Feb. 4, 1999) (order denying motion to dismiss entered Oct. 27, 1999) (alleging that Smith
& Wesson failed to act with reasonable care in implementing safety features for guns); Morial v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., No. 98-18578 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998) (order denying motion to dismiss
entered Dec. 10, 1999).
9. See, e.g., Complaint, City ofAtlanta (No. 99VS0149217J); Complaint, Mortal (No. 98-18578);
White v. High Point Firearms No. 1:99 CV 1134 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. filed Apr. 8, 1999).
10. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV99-036-1279 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Jan.
27, 1999) (order granting motion to dismiss entered Dec. 10, 1999); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., No. A9902369 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. filed Apr. 28, 1999) (alleging firearm manufacturers
"deceived, misled, and confused the city and its residents regarding the safety of guns"), dismissed, No.
A9902369, 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Oct. 7, 1999).
11. As used throughout this section, the term "municipal" refers to cities and counties acting in
their public, governmental (as opposed to proprietary) capacities. For a discussion of the possibility of
a municipality's ability to recover for damage to its property, see Note, Recovering the Costs of Public
Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1521
(2000) [hereinafter Public Nuisance Abatement] and infra Part VII.B. In addition, the State of New
York has recently joined the municipalities in filing suit. New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No.
402586/2000. That suit, which is grounded entirely in public nuisance, will be discussed along with the
municipal suits. See infra Part VI.
12. Some of the courts that have decided motions to dismiss municipalities' public nuisance
claims have granted the motions, but with unsatisfactory analysis. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. CV99-0153198S, 1999 WL 1241909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999); Penelas v. Arms
Tech., Inc., No. 99-01941 CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (order granting
motion to dismiss). But see City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. SUCV1999-02590-C (Mass.
Super. CL filed June 3, 1999) (motion to dismiss denied as to public nuisance July 13, 2000). Two of
these decisions are on appeal as of this writing, see Complaint, Ganim (No. CV99-01531985);
Complaint, Penelas (No. 99-01941 CA-06), while dismissal of the Cincinnati suit has been affirmed,
see City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WL 809838 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1.
Oct. 7, 1999), afl'd, 2000 WL 1133078 (Ohio App. Aug. 11, 2000). The Violence Policy Center
provides frequent updates, in useful chart form, of the status of this litigation. See Violence Policy Ctr.,
Litigation Against the Gun Industry, at http://www.vpc.org/litigate.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2001).
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suits against gun sellers as "junk litigation"'3 by offering a purely instrumentalist
justification for a public nuisance claim:
The idea is to divide, separate and weaken the gun manufacturers;
it makes them stretch out their own financial resources. We just
have to try a lot of different legal approaches. What we've tried
is to file suit under a 'public nuisance' theory. You keep putting
up a lot of different legal theories and new approaches, and sooner
or later, the dam is going to crack .... 14
Whether courts are influenced to dismiss public nuisance claims based on such
statements is, of course, a matter of speculation. Given the general confusion
surrounding the theory of nuisance law, though, it is not surprising that courts are
eager to avoid entertaining such claims.
Variously described as a "'wilderness' of law,"'" a "mystery,"' 6 a "legal
garbage can,"17 and "the least satisfactory department of [tort law], both to teacher
and student,"'8 nuisance law may be thought best avoided. Such avoidance,
however, is a large legal mistake. Indeed, for the reasons developed below, public
nuisance law is the best fit for municipal complaints against gun sellers.' 9 Properly
understood, a public nuisance claim filed by a state actor in its governmental
capacity is not a tort suit; rather, it is a legitimate exercise of state police power in
protecting the health and safety of the population.2 On the other hand, public
nuisance suits by private plaintiffs against gun sellers are tort claims and should be
remitted to other legal theories, such as negligent marketing or product defect.2
13. Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, So Sue Them, Sue Them, CATO Inst. Commentary, 12
(June 7, 1999), at http://www.cato.org/dailys/06-07-99.htnl (stating, without argument, "It is Chicago's
lawsuit that constitutes a public nuisance. The sale of guns does not violate any right common to the
general public."); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n Inst. for Legis. Action, Junk Lawsuits Against Gun Manufacturers,
at http'.//www.nraila.orgresearch/19990825-LawsuitPreemption-001.html (Feb. 24, 2000).
14. Timothy A. Bumann, Gun Control Through Retailer Litigation, BRIEF, Fall 1999, at 21
(quoting On the Record, CmI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1998).
15. HORACE WOOD, THE LAW OF NUIsANcEs, at iii (3d ed. 1893).
16. Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 984, 984 (1952).
17. William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942).
18. F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 480, 480 (1949).
19. As we make clear in infra Part VII, abatement relief and injunction are the remedies most
closely tailored to public nuisance. Recovery of damages, apart from those incurred in abating the
nuisance, are much more problematical and should be left to tort law.
20. Cf. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study ofInfectious Disease
Law in the United States, 99 COLuM. L. REV. 59, 103-05 (1999) (stating that in the nineteenth century
the source of the state's authority to act was the police power and public health measures were dictated
by necessity).
21. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the
jury could properly have found gun manufacturers negligent for their marketing and distribution
practices); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing dismissal
of suits by victims of gun violence who claimed that defendant designed and marketed its "fingerprint
resistant" TEC handguns to appeal to criminals).
[Vol. 52: 287
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Part 11 of this Article contains a brief discussion of the history and development
of the law of nuisance. We differentiate between the state's sometimes ill-defined
power under public nuisance law and the private plaintiff's ability to sue in tort for
damages caused by such nuisances.22 Understanding the different sources of legal
action is vital for analyzing the merits of the public nuisance claims in the
municipal complaints. Part II considers the general objections to the government's
use of public nuisance law, including the issue of whether a municipality-as
opposed to the state-may bring an action for public nuisance.
We then move to the central question of this Article: What, precisely, is the
public nuisance presented by guns? Inasmuch as gun sale and ownership is legal,
terming the conduct of gun sellers a public nuisance might seem at odds with
legislative decisions. Certain practices, however, amount to public nuisances by
subverting the intent of the law. After surveying the sparse canvas of gun-control
litigation, Part IV illustrates this point by analogizing guns to several hypothetical
cases involving the sale and marketing of automobiles. Part V then emphasizes the
unique fit between public nuisance law and the municipal suits by contrasting such
suits with private actions for public nuisance: the latter serve no defensible purpose
and should be abolished.
Part VI then tests the allegations of the municipal complaints against the law
of public nuisance, now properly understood. We demonstrate that the better-
drafted of the municipal complaints-particularly that of Chicago3--provide
working examples of the types of conduct that might constitute a public nuisance.
The point is thus underscored that making specific, conduct-based allegations can
overcome the presumptive legality of gun sales.
Finally, Part VII discusses the appropriate remedy for public nuisances. This
Article concludes that equitable relief is indicated and discusses the kinds of orders
that might be effective.24 For those municipalities that seek damages, Part VII
differentiates between the costs incurred in abating the nuisance and damages that
would compensate the city for costs not related to abatement and concludes that
only those costs reasonably assignable to abating the nuisance should be
recoverable under a public nuisance theory.
Our underlying goal is to remind litigants and courts that they possess the
conceptual arsenal sufficient to force gun sellers to pay the true cost of injuries
22. See discussion infra Parts II, 11.
23. The Cook County Circuit Court has dismissed Chicago's lawsuit City of Chicago v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (IL Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2000) (order granting motion to dismiss).
Initially, all legal theories except the public nuisance allegation were dismissed. See Todd Lighty, Suit
Hitting Gunmakers is Reloaded with Data, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2000, at NI. In September, 2000, that
portion of the complaint was also dismissed. See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-
15596 (IlL Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 15, 2000) (order granting motion to dismiss). See infra note 215 for
discussion of opinion dismissing complaint and for discussion of the current appellate posture of the
case.
24. Indeed, several California cities have sought only equitable relief, not damages. See Complaint
1 156, California ex rel. County of Los Angeles v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. 303753 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed July 25, 1999) (seeking "preliminary and permanent injunctive relief', complaint also
seeks civil penalties including "restitution and/or disgorgement of wrongfully obtained monies pursuant
to [the California] Business and Professions Code.. ."); California ex rel. County of San Francisco v.
Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. BC214794 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 6, 1999).
2001]
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caused by these dangerous products and that doing so does not require warping
well-settled legal doctrines and principles.
II. A TARGETED HISTORY OF PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
Understanding the root of public nuisance law requires us to begin with the law
of private nuisance, which preceded it. Private nuisance was one of the three
ancient assizes available to plaintiffs who alleged interference with a land interest.
The assize of novel disseisin applied where one had "[w]holly . . .deprive[d
someone] of the opportunity of exercising his rights over land."25 The familiar
assize of trespass was appropriate for interference with the landowner's rights to his
land not serious enough to amount to a dispossession, as long as the defendant
performed the act while on the plaintiff's land.26 The assize of nuisance was proper
for similarly less serious, but nontrespassory, invasions of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land.27
Public nuisance began life by analogy to this idea of interference with another's
land use. If interference with a private right of way constituted a private nuisance,
then interference with the public's right of way (or, with relevance to the time, the
King's right of way) would come to be called a public nuisance. As Professor
Newark has argued, it may be that this resemblance is only superficial; however,
Professor Spencer has noted that early legal scholars found the analogy
persuasive.2 9 Further, courts sometimes found the distinction necessary because
defendants charged with creating a private nuisance could defend by claiming that
the interference was really a public one. If that were so, the common law courts
were compelled to cede jurisdiction to the criminal courts.3 °
Once recognized in rudimentary form, public nuisance spun off two quite
unrelated developments. First, the types of interference cognizable as public
nuisances grew far beyond those affecting the public right of way to match the
many means by which one could interfere with the common good. Although such
interferences generally involved a defendant's use of land,3' they have come to take
25. Newark, supra note 18, at 481.
26. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) ("One is subject to liability to
another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of
the other if he intentionally, (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third
person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under
a duty to remove.").
27. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953); see also Janet Loengard, The
Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1978) (discussing
the origin of the assize of nuisance including careful consideration of primary materials); Newark, supra
note 18, at 481 (explaining the difference between a nuisance and a trespass); J.R. Spencer, Public
Nuisance-A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 56-57 (1989) (explaining the history of
assize of novel disseisin).
28. Newark, supra note 18, at 482.
29. Spencer, supra note 27, at 58.
30. Id. at 59.
31. See Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance andPublic Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the Common Law
(Part 1), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,292, 10,293 (1986) ("Generally, a nuisance is created
when one violates the duty to use one's property so as not to injure another ...."). It is not clear,
however, whether Professor Halper means to restrict the word "property" here to real property. Id.
[Vol. 52: 287
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in such diverse unneighborly behavior as "allowing infirm animals to wander,
selling unwholesome food and drink, washing hemp or flax in water used for cattle,
fishing or hunting out of season, [or] operating 'lewd ale-houses."'32 Thus, public
nuisance became an important component of what today is called the police power,
by which the state combats threats to the public health and safety.33
Second, matters came full circle. Just as private nuisance had inspired the
creation of public nuisance, private plaintiffs could now have a claim for public
nuisance, provided they could show they had suffered injury "distinct from the
harm suffered by the public in general." 4 Such an interference could also constitute
a private nuisance when the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of property was affected.
But the encroachment might also include personal injury, such as when a plaintiff
fell upon an obstacle on the public way.
Of course, a defendant who left such an encroachment was amenable to being
sued in negligence, in an action on the case for indirect injuries." But, by 1840,
complaints based on such conduct began to allege nuisance specifically. Thus arose
the confused situation whereby one injured in a vehicular collision would bring an
action in negligence, while one who drove into a pole left on the highway would
have stated a claim in public nuisance.36 As might have been expected, this
distinction produced confusion. For example, the English Court of Appeal once
opined "that a skidding omnibus might be a nuisance."'
For personal injury plaintiffs, suits for public nuisance seemed to offer the
substantial advantage of dispensing with the requirement of proving negligence.
The logic is straightforward. Inasmuch as the King, (today, the state) can bring suit
to abate a public nuisance" without regard to fault, private plaintiffs' actions are
32. Mary B, Spector, Crossing the Threshold: Examining the Abatement of Public Nuisances
Within the Home, 31 CONN. L. REv. 547, 550 (1999).
33. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 259-60 (2000) ("Today, public nuisances
are usually defined by the legislature .... The legislative... definition is often broad and virtually
coterminous with the police power....").
34. Halper, supra note 31, at 10,294; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1)
(1979) (stating that to recover damages, "one must have suffered a harm of a kind different from that
suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the
subject of the interference").
35. More precisely, the actions were brought on the case for indirect injury, because the tort of
negligence was not recognized as such until the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the allegations of these
complaints, made clear that "the lawyers of that time conceived of them as actions for negligence."
Newark, supra note 18, at 484 (citing cases in which plaintiffs were injured by obstacles on the
defendant's property).
36. Id. at 485-86.
37. Id. at 486 (citing Wing v. L.G.O. Co., 2 KB. 652 (1909)).
38. The word "abate" has a rich meaning in the context of nuisance, referring to a specific
equitable remedy available to the state for the purpose of protecting public health, safety, and welfare.
It literally means to "remove" the nuisance. See WINFIELDANDJOLOWlCZONTORT 635 (W.V.H. Rogers
ed., 13th ed. 1989). A certain imprecision of terms creeps in, however, because the more familiar
remedy of injunctive relief-whether complete or partial, permanent or temporary-will typically cause
the abatement of the nuisance. The municipal complaints that seek equitable relief generally couch their
requests in the language of injunction, not abatement. See, e.g., California ex rel. County of Los Angeles
v. Arcadia Machine & Tool Co., No. 303753 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 25, 1999) (seeking injunction);
California ex rel. County of San Francisco v. Arcadia Machine & Tool Co., No. BC214794 (Cal. Super.
Ct. filed Aug. 6, 1999); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (I. Cir. Ct. filed
2001]
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based on the same conduct, and thus, the syllogism concludes, should be governed
by the same legal rules. However, in practice courts generally have not permitted
plaintiffs to dispense with a showing that the defendant was somehow at fault.39
Nonetheless, the side-by-side presence of negligence and nuisance claims for
personal injury has introduced unwelcome and unnecessary confusion into the
decisional law.4"
We have come, then, to the present situation in which the term "nuisance"
encompasses three distinct concepts. First, and of little relevance to the municipal
suits, is the original use of the term to denote a purely private, nontrespassory
interference with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of her land.4" Second, there are state
actions against those who interfere with dangers to "health, safety, convenience
[and] public peace,"'42 rights common to the public. Historically, these actions were
brought as criminal proceedings.43 Today, such actions may either be brought under
general criminal nuisance statutes,' by authority of statutes criminalizing what had
Nov. 12, 1998). Indeed, the New York complaint, which seeks abatement but provides no details as to
the kinds of actions that would nullify the problem, underscores that injunctive relief will typically be
indicated. New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586/2000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed June 26,2000). How
else would the nuisance be abated?
39. As Professor Halper explains, this was not always the case. Halper, supra note 31, at 10,294.
Until recently, plaintiffs were able to avoid the difficulties of a negligence claim by suing in nuisance,
which contains no fault requirement Id. By the twentieth century, though, this tactic began to prove less
successful. An often-cited example of judicial ability to pierce the allegations of the complaint to find
a negligence suit camouflaged by a claim for nuisance is McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E.
391 (N.Y. 1928). In Chief Justice Cardozo's words, a plaintiff "may not avert the consequences of his
own contributory negligence by affixing to the negligence of the wrongdoer the label of a nuisance."
Id. at 392.
The words "somehow at fault" used in the text of this Article are purposefully chosen to reflect
possibilities of fault other than negligence. A defendant may also be liable to a plaintiff for actions that
would otherwise bring strict liability, such as selling a defective product, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965), or engaging in abnormally dangerous activity, id. § 519(1). As will become
clear in Part V of this Article, it is these categories to which a court should have referenced in suits
brought by private plaintiffs-not nuisance.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 150-60. See generally Halper, supra note 31, at 10,297-99
(discussing movement from strict liability to a fault-based standard in private suits and the effect of that
shift on suits brought by public entities).
41. "A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977).
42. Note, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1752, 1761 (2000) [hereinafter Civil
Litigation].
43. See generally Spencer, supra note 27, at 56-66 (describing the history of the crime of public
nuisance); Halper, supra note 31, 10,293-94 (giving history of state public nuisance actions). Spencer's
description of the history of this vaguely defined crime is clear and enlightening. However, as discussed
infra Part fII.A, critics have charged that, given the open-ended definition of public nuisance as
anything that is inimical to public health, the general crime of public nuisance offends "modem notions
of certainty and precision in criminal law." Spencer, supra note 27, at 55.
44. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1191 (West 1983) (making public nuisance a
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been common-law nuisances,4" or as civil actions. 46 In some states, both civil and
criminal actions are appropriate.47 Public nuisance actions are generally brought in
equity, seeking an injunction or abatement of the nuisance.4 ' However, it is much
less clear whether the state may recover damages.49
Finally, private plaintiffs who have suffered a distinct injury from any proper
subject of a state action for public nuisance may bring a tort claim for public
nuisance. The remedies may include damages, an injunction, or abatement.5 As we
shall see, however, there is good reason for abolishing the tort of public nuisance,
at least where the remedy sought is personal injury damages."
I. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE THEORY
A. Public Nuisance is a Broad, Archaic Doctrine
In the time of common-law crimes, the offense of public nuisance naturally
expanded outward from interference with the public's right of way to become a
kind of wastebasket, capturing offenses that did not fit neatly into any category. As
Professor Spencer points out, early attempts to create a taxonomy of the criminal
law resulted in "an annoying pile of bits and pieces left over.,52 According to
Spencer, William Hawkins, the first "to arrange the multitude of crimes according
45. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (West 2000) (allowing local action to abate drug-related
or prostitution-related public nuisances and criminal street gang activity and permitting similar action
to declare certain buildings and premises to be public nuisances); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(1)
(MeKinney 1999) (declaring the possession or use of certain weapons a nuisance).
46. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.01 (West 1994) (providing for an action for damages or abatement
of a public nuisance); see also Civil Litigation, supra note 42, at 1763-68 (discussing other anti-crime
civil litigation). Government-driven civil litigation raises concerns of its own. See Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding
and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1990-91); Christopher
S. Yoo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89
Nw. U. L. REv. 212 (1994); see also infra Part III.A (considering the concerns of government driven
litigation and arguing that, properly limited, public nuisance can be a fair and effective tool in
combating certain practices in which gun sellers engage).
47. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 8 (West 2000) ("[Rlemedies against a public nuisance
are: 1. Indictment or information, or, 2. A civil action, or, 3. Abatement."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-3-
102 (Supp. 2000) (conferring jurisdiction "upon the chancery, circuit, and criminal courts... to abate
public nuisances").
48. "[R]emedies... such as... abatement of the nuisance or injunction may lie in favor of the
state .... " REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, cmt. d (1977); see also Public Nuisance
Abatement, supra note 11, at 1536-38 (explaining that states routinely give cities the power to abate
public nuisances).
49. Public Nuisance Abatement, supra note 11, at 1531-36; see infra Part VII (exploring the issue
of remedies).
50. DANB. DOBBS, THE LAWOFTORTS § 468 (2000) (explaining the application of compensatory
and punitive damages, or an injunction that might require abatement of the nuisance, or, less drastically,
"ordering the defendant to minimize... the nuisance"). Public Nuisance Abatement, supra note 11, at
1339.
51. See infra Part V.
52. Spencer, supra note 27, at 65.
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to a lofty theoretical scheme,"53 stuffed these "bits and pieces" into the residual
category of common nuisance. The broad compass of the offenses comprised by
common nuisance makes it "amazing that anyone should assume that Hawkins was
describing a single offence, rather than making a residual category." 4 Nonetheless,
this blunderbuss entity has survived to the present time, although it is now generally
set forth in statute."
One can make a respectable argument for doing away with the general crime
of public nuisance. Given the harsh sanctions of the criminal law and the
concomitant requirement of precision in drafting to provide notice of the prohibited
actions,56 it may seem difficult to endorse an offense of such "staggering sweep.
'57
In fact, many of the harms that were once captured under the rubric of public
nuisance have since been made the subject of specific criminal or administrative
law. 8 For example, environmental degradation is now comprehensively regulated
at the federal level,59 while more local concerns, such as noise,6" the keeping of
animals,6' and the sale of spoiled food,62 may be the subject of state law or local
ordinance. Indeed, the illegal possession of handguns itself may be declared a
public nuisance. 3 Because these laws provide notice of the conduct that is
prohibited, the argument runs, they should be favored over the less precise law of
public nuisance.'
53. Id.
54. Id. at 66.
55. See supra note 44-46 and accompanying text.
56. Spencer, supra note 27, at 78.
57. Civil Litigation, supra note 42, at 1760. The authors of CivilLitigation are in error, however,
in categorizing the state action for public nuisance as a "tort."
58. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 76-77 (listing examples from Britain).
59. See Cheh, supra note 46, at 1404 n.421 (identifying relevant statutes).
60. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-12-101 to -109 (2000) (declaring "noise... a major source
of environmental pollution" and authorizing the creation of standards for noise levels).
61. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-10 (Michie Supp. 1999) (making unlawful the keeping of
"any animal known to be vicious and liable to attack or injure human beings" and "any unvaccinated
dog or cat" and prohibiting the failure or refusal "to destroy vicious or unvaccinated dogs or cats with
symptoms of rabies"); 53 PA. CoNsT. STAT. ANN. § 14982 (West 1998) (requiring a permit from the
Board of Health as a condition of keeping or slaughtering livestock in residential premises).
62. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 383 (West 1999) (declaring the knowing sale of adulterated
food or drugs a misdemeanor offense); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 4 (Vest 1997) (prohibiting
the use of spoiled or contaminated ingredients in bakery products).
63. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.05(1) (McKinney 1999) ("Any weapon, instrument, appliance
or substance specified in article two hundred sixty-five [including certain unlicensed firearms and
loaded firearms possessed with intent to use illegally] when unlawfully possessed, manufactured,
transported or disposed of, or when utilized in the commission of an offense, is hereby declared a
nuisance."); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3217(a), (b) (Supp. 2000) (defining pistols as "dangerous
articles" and providing that any "dangerous article unlawfully owned, possessed or carried is... a
nuisance"). Such statutes are good policy, but should not be thought to limit or define the permissible
scope of state action. For example, New York State's complaint alleges both statutory and common law
nuisance. New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586/2000, complaint 63-64 (statutory), 65-66
(common law) (N.Y. Super. Ct. filed June 26, 2000). Adding a common law claim avoids the problem
of a statute that does not specifically capture the conduct imperiling the public health and safety.
64. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 76-80.
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The question remains, though, of what should be done about serious threats to
the public health that are not prohibited by specific statutes. If the state had no
power beyond these laws, it would be helpless to prevent certain threats to the
public health. For example, a toxic chemical useful in certain applications might
endanger public health and safety through accidental release.65 Public nuisance law
could justify an injunction if the behavior that led to the release were controllable
and likely to be repeated, or, more likely, could justify requiring the offender to
cover the cost of abating the nuisance.66 Public nuisance law could also protect
citizens, for example, if emerging evidence revealed a chemical's toxicity and that
chemical then had the potential to cause great harm before the legislature could
regulate its release.67 In short, some residual power, at least to abate public
nuisances, is a necessary incident of the state's obligation to protect the public
health: "[T]here may be a case for a general offence of doing anything which
creates a major hazard to the physical safety or health of the public .... 6
The states agree. The power to abate public nuisances is broadly recognized
and resides in the state's plenary police power.69 In general, civil proceedings are
indicated in the case of gun sales. The criminal law, with its focus on arrest,
prosecution, and incarceration, is better suited to dealing with individual
65. In Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1980), twenty-thousand
gallons of phenol, a known poison, spilled into the soil near local wells. Id. at 1125. Because of the
contamination, the city was obliged to drill a deep well that was "separated by an impermeable layer
of shale from the contaminated aquifer." Id. at 1126. The court permitted East Troy to recover the cost
of abating what was obviously a public nuisance. Id. at 1132. As discussed in the text of this Article,
it is preferable to deal with such issues legislatively.
66. In United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1942), the United
States was able to recover the cost of fire-fighting under a Virginia statute that specifically authorized
recovery against anyone who had "negligently or intentionally" started a fire. Id. at 310 (quoting VA.
CODE § 4435(b) (1936)). The court also noted that recovery would have been permissible under
common law tort principles. Id. at 310-11. Interestingly, the case makes no mention of public nuisance
doctrine.
67. For example, in Florida v. Tampa Elec. Co., 291 So.2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court
held that it had jurisdiction to abate the nuisance created by "sulfur dioxide, sulfur trioxide and other
noxious and deleterious chemicals," despite the defendant's objection that the issue was properly within
the ambit of the Department of Pollution Control, which had promulgated but not yet effectuated
stringent regulation of such chemicals. Id. at 46,48. Language from the Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act bolstered the court's holding, to wit: "'It is the purpose of this act to provide additional and
cumulative remedies to prevent, abate, and control the pollution of the air and waters of the state.
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to abridge or alter rights of action or remedies in equity
under the ... law. .. [nor] as estopping the state or any municipality.., to suppress nuisances or to
abate pollution."' Id. at 48 n.8 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 403-191(1) (1971)). Cf. Vill. of Wilsonville v.
SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981) (holding the court had authority to abate public nuisance
although landfill site regulations did not strictly apply to defendant).
68. Spencer, supra note 27, at 84.
69. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating the "regulation and
abatement of nuisances is one of the basic functions of the police power"). For a discussion on the
definition and breadth of police power and its relation to nuisance abatement, see Gostin et al., supra
note 20, at 103-05. As a general matter, the police power belongs to the state, not to local government.
Where the threat to public health is specific to a particular location, however, the entity responsible for
governance of that location may have power to act. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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misconduct of a serious nature." Civil remedies, less constrained by the
constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants,7' have greater flexibility
and scope; therefore, it is not surprising that the municipal gun suits have generally
taken the civil route.72 The remainder of this Part focuses on the ability of a
municipality to seek the equitable remedies of abatement and injunction.
B. States, Rather Than Municipalities, Have Authority to Sue for Public
Nuisance
In addition to the problem of the general legitimacy of nuisance law, critics
have argued that local governments are powerless to proceed under a public
nuisance theory. As mentioned above, the power to abate public nuisances is best
described as an incident of the state's police power. By what authority, then, do
local governments bring such suits? Often, the power is explicitly conferred on the
local authorities through legislation. For example, Chicago's lawsuit is buttressed
by a legislative grant of power: "The corporate authorities of each municipality
may define, prevent, and abate nuisances."" Legislative grants of authority are
typical; states have been granting municipalities the authority to abate nuisances
within their jurisdictional limits since the nineteenth century.74 Even absent such
70. See Cheb, supra note 46, at 1332. A corollary is that, where serious misconduct can be traced
to a particular individual, such as when a gun retailer sold a gun to someone the retailer knew intended
to use the weapon in a crime of violence, the sanctions of the criminal law should be invoked. For
example, Chicago's "sting" operation that preceded the filing of its complaint revealed retailer conduct
indicating knowledge that the guns purchased were to be used for criminal purposes. See Complaint at
27, City of Chicago, No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998); Barry M. Neier, U.S. Appears
Prepared to Indict 4 Gun Dealers in Chicago Sting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1999, at A17.
71. The statement in the text invites a chorus of complaint. Constitutional protections, particularly
the requirement of procedural due process, of course apply in the civil context. Professor Cheh's article
provides a helpful analysis of due process issues in the civil context, making the point that constitutional
scrutiny should be tied to the interest potentially affected, not solely to whether the proceeding is
criminal or civil. See Cheh, supra note 46, at 1369-72. The discussion in the text of this Article assumes
that the defendants will be afforded due process before any deprivation of property, or other conditions,
are imposed.
72. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., SUMMARY OF LAwSUITS FILED BY CITIES AND COUNTIES
AGAiNSTTHE GUNINDUSTRY, athttp://www.vpc.org/litigate.htm (last visited Feb. 25,2001) (presenting
Violence Policy Center municipal complaints in useful chart form); see also infra Part V11 (discussing
the proper remedies under a public nuisance proceeding and the difficulties in seeking damages).
73. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-60-2 (West 1993); see also ALA. CODE § 11-47-118 (1992)
("Municipalities may maintain a civil action to enjoin and abate any public nuisance, injurious to the
health, morals, comfort or welfare of the community or any portion thereof."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-148(c)(7)(E) (West 1999) (granting municipalities power to "[d]efine, prohibit and abate within the
municipality all nuisances and causes thereof, and all things detrimental to the health, morals, safety,
convenience and welfare of its inhabitants and cause the abatement of any nuisance at the expense of
the owner or owners'); Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1127 (7th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Wis. STATS. § 61.34(1) (Supp. 1979-80)) (holding a grant of authority to village boards from
the state of Wisconsin to act "for the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the public" supported
a town's action for damages incurred in abating a nuisance).
74. See Gostin et al., supra note 20, at 104-05 ("The problem of authority to declare and abate
nuisances was particularly salient for local governments .... Hence, grants of power to health officials
and local governments tended to be made in broad terms.").
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an express grant of authority, decisional law has recognized the implicit right of a
local authority to abate nuisances within its limits.75 As one court stated, "Equitable
jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is... of 'ancient origin,' and it exists even
where not conferred by statute .... 76
Of course, the ability to give is the ability to take away. In response to, or even
in anticipation of, municipal lawsuits against gun sellers, some states have enacted
legislation that specifically prohibits local government from bringing suit against
gun sellers-often by reserving that right for the state itself.77 Where such statutes
unambiguously cover the subject of the lawsuits in question, the statutes should
result in dismissal of the suit. However, in cases where a public nuisance suit
attempts to enjoin conduct that effects a subversion of the law, a state-wide
regulatory scheme covering the sale of guns should not preclude the suit. This point
was not appreciated in Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc.,7" when Miami-Dade
County's claim, including a public nuisance count, was dismissed because it
conflicted with state law concerning the "manufacture, sale, and distribution of
firearms ."79 But the court did not spell out the nature of that conflict. Whatever the
nature of this unspecified conflict, Penelas is in error. Absent an express
prohibition on suits against gun sellers, public nuisance suits and the gun-control
laws of the state will often be complementary, with public nuisance allowing a city
75. See Town of East Troy, 653 F.2d at 1123.
76. City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 162 (I1. 1982) (municipal
authority to abate nuisance within city limits was not defined by statute).
77. See GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-4815 (Supp. 1999) ('The authority to bring suit and right to
recover against any firearms or ammunitions manufacturer, trade association, or dealer by or on behalf
of any governmental unit... for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to
the lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public shall be
reserved exclusively to the state."). A similar law in Pennsylvania did not stop the City of Philadelphia
from filing its lawsuit against a host of gun sellers. Michael Rubinkah, Despite State Law, Philadelphia
Sues Gun Makers, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at A3. One of the city's arguments is that the law
applies only to the legal marketing of guns, whereas the suit targets illegal marketing practices. See City
of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., No. 2000-CV-2463, N 17A, 28, 60 (Pa. Ct. Comm. P1. filed
April 11, 2000) (order granting motion to dismiss entered Dec. 20, 2000).
78. No. 99-1941, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (order granting motion to
dismiss).
79. Id. at *2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.33). Judge Dean's opinion also reveals an incomplete
understanding of public nuisance law. First, she notes that the public nuisance cases cited by the county
either involved statutory violations or "a direct connection to real property owned or operated by the
government entity." Id. at *4. As noted above, public nuisance may also apply when any serious threat
to the public health is involved, whether or not a specific statute has been violated. Further, the
comment about the "direct connection to real property" seems to succumb to the confusion between
public and private nuisance discussed earlier. Judge Dean also states an independent reason for
dismissing the nuisance claim: the defendants have no control over the activity which creates the
nuisance. Id. This statement is either unhelpfully circular (What is the activity creating the nuisance?)
or makes an unwarranted assumption. According to Judge Dean, "The activity which creates the
nuisance... is the criminal or reckless misuse of firearms by third parties ..... Id. But it might also
be defined to include recklessly supplying firearms to those who can be expected to misuse them.
Whether defendants have control over, or responsibility for, such persons is an open question.
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to enjoin conduct that would subvert legislative goals." The interest of a
municipality in protecting the health and safety of its residents should be
respected."' To hold otherwise is to deny public authorities the right to use the
police power, one of the basal powers of government, to protect their citizens from
an identified threat.
Environmental law decisions attest to the continued vitality of municipal use
of public nuisance law to protect the public health. An instructive example is City
of Evansville, Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc. 2 The defendants, both
located in Kentucky, were a recycling plant that discharged toxic chemicals into the
sewer system and the sewer system that then discharged those chemicals into the
Ohio River.8" The plaintiffs were municipal corporations situated in Indiana.8
Because of the interstate nature of the pollution, the plaintiffs sued under various
federal laws, none of which was found to apply,8" and under the federal common
law of nuisance.8 6 The district court dismissed all claims, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed as to all but the nuisance claim. 7 As to that claim, the court had to decide
whether municipalities have standing to sue or whether this right runs in favor of
the state only.88
In reaching its decision, the court focused on the confluence between the party
bringing the suit and the damages sought: "They eek only to recover for
themselves and other similarly situated municipal bodies damages for expenses
they incurred because of defendants' discharges of toxic chemicals ... ."" Thus,
although the state would typically be the party to bring suit for pollution of
interstate waterways, an organ of the state was held to have standing commensurate
with its own injury.9" Municipal standing, absent express preemption or prohibition
80. The above statement leaves open the possibility that a particular public nuisance suit will work
at cross-purposes to a state statute. In such a case, the suit should be dismissed. The Penelas court erred
in assuming such a conflict based solely on the presence of state regulation. See Penelas, 1999 WL
1204353, at *2.
81. An interesting question that arises is why no state other than New York has brought suit
against the gun sellers. See New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586/2000, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
June 26, 2000). More than twenty cities have filed suit against the gunsellers. This seems to be a
situation in which the states and the cities have divergent interests: the cities are intimately familiar with
the toll exacted by gun violence in a way that the states may not be. Suburban areas that surround cities
may also profit from the sale of guns that then find their way into cities with strict gun control laws. See
Public Nuisance Abatement, supra note 11, at 1533. Such divergence of interests is highlighted in states
that have gone the "extra step" of prohibiting local suits against gun sellers-a step they have not taken
in the context of other public nuisances.
82. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979).
83. See id. at 1010.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1010-17.
86. See id. at 1017-19.
87. Seeid. at 1010-11, 1019.
88. See City of Evansville, Indiana, 604 F.2d at 1017-19.
89. Id. at 1017.
90. Id. at 1019 (citing Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1214
(D.N.J. 1978)). The court also had before it the issue of remedy. It summarily rejected the defendants'
claim that it lacked jurisdiction because damages for treatment, as opposed to injunctive relief, were
requested. See id. The question of remedy was not relevant to jurisdiction; the request for damages
(apart from whether, at trial, such damages would be awarded) was proper. See id. In so deciding, the
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by the state, should be even clearer when the state's independent interest, as
distinct from the municipality's, is less obvious than in the case of interstate
pollution.9' As the next section demonstrates, gun violence may be one such case.
IV. DEFINING AND APPLYING PUBLIC NUISANCE TO SUITS AGAINST GUN SELLERS
A frequent objection to the use of public nuisance theory in firearms litigation
is that the manufacture, distribution, and sale of guns is lawful and subject to
substantial regulation.92 Thus, the argument goes, allowing public nuisance lawsuits
to proceed amounts to stealth legislation. However, this broadside attack proves too
much. If its logic were followed in every case, public nuisance would be reduced
to irrelevance. The theory is most useful in those cases where regulation does not
protect public health and safety. Without nuisance law, states and local
governments would be helpless in the face of serious challenges to public
health-challenges that their police power obligates them to meet.
That said, the critics are not entirely wrong. For example, a municipality or
state that sought, through public nuisance litigation, to drive guns from the market
entirely, would plainly exceed its mandate.93 Whether one is pleased with the
achievements or not, there has been a great deal of effort devoted to gun regulation,
resulting in an array of laws that prohibit the sale or ownership of certain kinds of
weapons," ban the advertising of unlawful weapons,9" require background checks
and attendant waiting periods,96 and disqualify certain classes of purchasers.97
court recognized the flexibility of public nuisance law. Although the case does not so state, it may be
reasonable to assume that the defendants had already ceased the conduct giving rise to the lawsuit, so
the appropriate recovery would be, in nuisance terms, the cost of abating the nuisance. See infra Part
VII
91. See, e.g., Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159 (Ill. 1982) (placing restrictions
on lewd-dancing establishment located in the city).
92. See, e.g., Order at *8, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 Ohio
Misc. LEXIS 27 (Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 27, 1999) (holding "public nuisance simply does not apply to the
design, manufacture and distribution of a lawful product"); Order at *4, Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc.,
No. 99-1941-CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (holding the law of public
nuisance does not apply); see also Richard A. Epstein, Lawsuits Aimed at Guns Probably Won't Hit
Crime, WALL STREET J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A26 ("Congress, states and local governments have passed
thousands of statutes and ordinances designed to clamp down on gun distribution. By all means enforce
them.").
93. The statement in the text should not be read as suggesting that litigation should never have
the indirect effect of driving a product off the market. Indeed, if the costs of that product, properly
internalized, are greater than consumers are willing to bear, the product is not cost-justified. See
generally David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980)
(discussing the theory and limitations of cost-internalization).
94. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for a person to manufacture,
transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon.").
95. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020.5 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting any type of advertising
device).
96. See, e.g., WASH. REv. ANN. CODE § 9.41.110(5) (West 2000) (imposing a waiting period for
granting a dealer a license and requiring background checks for dealers' employees).
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Moreover, whatever the shortcomings of the democratic process," the laws respond
to a welter of contradictory and inconclusive information about the costs and
benefits of gun ownership and sale. A particularly pointed example is the
controversy concerning the use of guns for defensive purposes. Some data suggest
that such defensive uses occur about two million times each year, while other social
scientists have criticized the methodology used in arriving at these estimates and
have placed the number much lower.99 Of course, the credence given to one
conclusion over the other will dictate public policy. Other difficult factual issues
concerning the use of guns abound.' Given the superior fact-finding capabilities
of legislatures, courts should be loathe to render decisions that would force them
to take a position on such issues that would be in tension with legislative
determination.'°' In short, an overly broad use of public nuisance theory, especially
if sanctioned by courts, would validate critics' concerns about the potential for
abuse of such a broadly defined power.
What, then, is the proper role of public nuisance theory? In the case of a lawful
product such as guns, the public nuisance emerges from conduct that poses a threat
to public health and safety beyond what the legislature contemplated. This
statement is more difficult to apply than might first appear, however. What did the
legislature contemplate? What can be implied from legislative silence concerning
a particular practice? Courts must tread carefully, striking a balance between
protection of the public health and safety on the one hand and due respect for a
coordinate branch of government on the other. The political swirl surrounding the
gun issue makes this task even more daunting.
In answering these difficult questions, it is appropriate to begin by briefly
surveying the backdrop of laws that pertain to gun sales. Then we undertake an
examination of the public nuisance presented by guns in perhaps an unusual
way-by taking a deliberate step back from the gun context and analyzing instead
the less politically charged example of automobiles. Through the use of three
hypothetical cases-two suggested by Professor Lytton, and one of our own-we
98. See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUrL L. REV. 533, 533 (2000) ("[C]ourts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas legislatures
tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, hasty, and unwilling or unable to offer reasons for
their actions."); see also Mark Curriden, Putting the Squeeze on Juries, 86 A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 52,
58 (describing a host of state statutes shielding various special interest defendants from tort liability).
99. See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA: NATIONAL
SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 8 (1997) (estimating defensive uses ranging
from 108,000 per year to 23 million, depending on survey methodology).
100. Among the mostly hotly debated of these issues is what percentage of guns used in crimes
is illegally obtained. See MARIANNEW. ZAWvTZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUNS USED IN CRIME 3 (1995)
(citing study of inmate gun possession, a study ofjuvenile offenders, and studies of adult and juvenile
offenders by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services).
101. See TimothyD. Lytton, Tort ClaimsAgainst Gun Manufacturersfor Crime-Related Inuries:
Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1,
52-54 (2000). Professor Lytton is correct to note that legislatures have greater institutional capacity to
engage in complex statistical analysis; however, his suggestion that claims of great statistical
complexity should, for that reason, be dismissed by courts as beyond their competence is questionable.
Id. Our point in the text is that the legislature should generally control when it has considered the
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set out the proper role for public nuisance in cases involving products that pose a
substantial danger to public health and safety."°2 Only after dissecting those cases
do we return to the gun issue, having by then demonstrated that public nuisance can
be managed, and therefore, can be useful, even in the most politically difficult
situations.
A. The Inadequacy of Current Firearms Regulation
The hazards of firearms are well documented. A recent survey showed that
more than thirty-two thousand Americans suffered fatal gunshot wounds in 1997.1"3
Those fatalities included homicides, accidental shootings, and suicides."° In
addition, approximately another sixty-four thousand nonfatal firearm-related
injuries occurred that same year.'1 5 A survey conducted in 1994 placed American
gun ownership at 192 million, ranging in size and firepower from small .22-caliber
pistols to elaborate and sophisticated rifles.° 6 Ownership of semiautomatic
handguns, which are easily concealed and feature substantial firepower, has risen
dramatically since 1980. In 1980, these guns represented thirty-two percent of all
handguns produced in the United States (the majority of handguns were still
revolvers), but the percentage grew to seventy-five percent in 1998.107 Statistics
demonstrate that persons acquiring handguns after 1993 have demanded larger
magazine capacities and higher caliber firearms.1"t Manufacturers have
correspondingly increased the lethality of their handgun designs, even with the
availability of safer alternative designs."w
Regulation of firearms in the United States is minimal, considering these
statistics and that guns are inherently dangerous because of their capability and use
for killing and maiming human beings. The existing legal structure aimed at
firearms generally focuses on parties other than the manufacturers-targeting those
who commit gun-related crimes, those who unlawfully possess guns, or retailers
who sell firearms. Various laws appear at the federal, state, and local levels. But
102. If such a danger does exist, an action for public nuisance would be proper against the entity
that created it, whether or not that entity acted culpably. See discussion infra Part V. The present
analysis sometimes refers to culpable conduct because a finding of such conduct might be relevant to
determining that legislative will has been circumvented. But, as a doctrinal matter, the effect of the
conduct is what matters.
103. Hoyert et al., supra note 2, at 68 tbl.16.
104. Id.
105. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., supra note
3, at 1031.
106. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 99, at 5.
107. VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, FIREARM FACTs, at http-//www.vpc.org/fact-sht/fireann.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2000) (compiling data from excise tax data obtained from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms).
108. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 99, at 5.
109. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as
Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1197 (2000). Vemick & Teret note that in 1985, handgun
manufacturers produced 844,000 revolvers and 707,000 semiautomatic pistols, but that by 1993, the
manufacturers were making 2.2 million semiautomatic pistols, compared to only 550,000 revolvers. Id.
at 1198 n.27 (citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, ANNUAL FIREARMs
MANUFACTURING AND EXPORT REPORT (1994)).
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this patchwork quilt of legislation is inadequate to reach many of the significant
acts and transactions leading to gun-related deaths and injuries.
On the federal level, the Gun Control Act of 1968, amended in 1993 by the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("the Act"), limits gun transactions to
those between licensed dealers and residents of the same state as the dealer.'" The
Act requires that any person "engaged in the business" of making or selling
firearms be appropriately licensed."' The Act also prohibits the sale of all firearms
to persons under the age of eighteen and the sale of handguns to persons under the
age of twenty-one." 2 Further, the dealers must obtain information from purchasers
to be used in a background check of the purchaser's criminal history."3 Whether
a waiting period exists to allow for the background check varies from state to
state. 14 However, the secondary market in firearms is not regulated under the Act.
This means that once a firearm has left the hands of a licensed dealer, any
subsequent transactions are essentially unregulated."5 This lapse of regulation is
particularly significant when one considers that approximately two million gun
transactions occur annually on the secondary market."
6
Although the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") has some
authority to license dealers and carry out provisions of the Act,"7 as well as
additional authority over taxing and exports,"' it has no general authority to
regulate firearms in the United States. Nor does the Consumer Product Safety
Commission ("CPSC") have any regulatory authority over firearms. Congress has
stated that the CPSC "shall make no ruling or order that restricts the manufacture
or sale of firearms" or ammunition." 9
While states have been involved in some licensing and sale requirements
imposed on firearm dealers, the states have focused their attention on users of guns
and the criminal justice system. In addition to criminal statutes prohibiting the usual
array of gun crimes, states also restrict a person's ability to legally carry a firearm
on their person or in their vehicle. Yet, many states allow their citizens to carry
concealed firearms if they have applied and qualified for a permit. 2
Thus, regulation of firearm design, manufacture, and marketing is spotty at
best. Although the Act authorizes ATF to restrict imported firearms to those
adaptable to "sporting purposes,'' this restriction has not been extended to guns
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5), (b)(3) (2000).
111. See id. § 923.
112. See id. § 922(b)(1).
113. See id. § 922(s), (t).
114. Vernick & Teret, supra note 109, at 1196.
115. Some intrastate transfer requirements apply to non-licensed sales. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(3),
(5) (2000).
116. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 99, at 7 (reporting, in addition, that hundreds of thousands of
guns are stolen annually from households in the United States).
117. 27 C.F.R. Vol. 1, Pts. 1-273 (2000).
118. 27 C.F.R. Vol. 1, Pts. 47 & 53 (2000).
119. Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284,
§ 3(e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (1976).
120. See COOK&LUDWIG, supra note 99, at 7-8; see also Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying
Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State PanelData, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240 (1998).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (2000).
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manufactured in the United States. 122 Rather, the Act bans "assault weapons" that
meet certain specific design criteria and have certain large-capacity ammunition
magazines.2 While a few states have banned certain guns frequently used in
criminal activity,'24 the design, manufacture, and marketing of many guns with little
sporting utility remain unregulated.
The lawsuits brought by municipalities against the gun industry manifest the
frustration with the failure of existing legislation to effectively address the hazards
of guns to the public. Public costs resulting from firearm-related violence,
accidents, and suicides are high. Direct costs of an incident may include law
enforcement response costs, fire department response costs, medical emergency
response personnel, emergency transportation, and medical and rehabilitative
treatment for the victim. Shootings resulting in arrest and conviction consume
public resources in the judicial and penal systems. Additional costs may include
increased law enforcement surveillance and enhanced emergency response
services."'
It is no wonder that municipalities have been frustrated by the lack of effective
federal and state legislation and the endless political debate over gun control.
Meanwhile, the gun industry has continued to market increasingly dangerous
products without being held responsible for the damage and costs those products
incur. Thus, through these civil lawsuits, the municipalities have taken matters into
their own hands to hold the industry accountable to a degree that existing regulation
has not achieved.
B. The Automobile Analogy: When is a Car a Public Nuisance?
Permitting litigation against gun sellers would supposedly lead to a parade of
horrible lawsuits, in which cars are often the grand marshal.'26 Indeed, to hold a car
manufacturer liable for injuries or death suffered by one struck by the car, even
where the driver acted with intent to harm, would violate basic tort principles of
causation and responsibility. Cars are mostly used for lawful purposes, and, at least
according to some, guns are also used mostly for lawful purposes such as self-
defense or recreation.'27 So, the argument goes, the criminal misuse of a car or gun
should not result in liability. It would seem to follow that public nuisance law
would not apply, either. This argument is too simplistic, however. Two personal
injury automobile cases suggested by Professor Lytton, although dismissed by him
122. See Vemick & Teret, supra note 109, at 1197.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 922(v), (w) (2000).
124. See Vemick & Teret, supra note 109, at 1197 & n.23.
125. One commentator noted that a single firearm victim may cost the public more than one
million dollars. See Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A RoadmapforReforming
Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. Louis. U. PuB. L. REv. 247, 252-53 (1999) (citing news articles from
Washington Post and U.S. News & World Report).
126. See, e.g., Winifred Weitsen Boyle, Comment, There's No Smoking Gun: Cities Should Not
Sue the Firearm Industry, 25 DAYTON L. REV. 215, 225 (2000). The same argument was made against
the tobacco lawsuits. See Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule ofLaw,
22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601, 648 (1998) ("What comes next-coffee, soft drinks, red meat, dairy products,
sugar, fast foods, automobiles, sporting goods?" (emphasis added)).
127. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAuL L. REv. 435, 453 (1999).
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as "outlandish,"'128 in fact allow us to consider the line that might be drawn in the
name of public nuisance. In the first case ("Case 1"), an injured pedestrian sues the
manufacturer of a stolen car for failing to design locks that would make the car
more difficult to steal. In the second case ("Case 2"), a similar plaintiff sues the
manufacturer of a car sold to an unlicensed driver for failure to supervise retail car
sales.
129
Lytton attempts to distinguish these cases from those involving guns by noting
that "gun crimes differ in important ways from crimes committed with
automobiles" because "gun crime [is a] more significant social problem than crimes
committed with automobiles." 30 Although this statement is factually correct, it does
not follow that misconduct involving the sale of automobiles should never be the
proper subject of tort liability. However, it may be that we operate with a lower
level of confidence in the less-studied question of automobiles and injury. In the
first example above, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for liability would be
a showing that drivers of stolen cars are more likely to drive negligently and run
down pedestrians than are other drivers.' Some courts appear to have made such
an assumption by imposing liability on drivers who leave their keys in the ignition
and whose stolen cars are then negligently driven and injure a pedestrian.1
2
Whether this is true is an empirical matter, and courts might be criticized for
drawing such a conclusion without factual support.' 3 On the other hand, if it were
shown that stolen cars were involved in accidents at a significantly higher rate than
other cars, the case for imposing liability on a manufacturer who passed up an easy
chance to design theft-proof cars might be compelling.
As for the second case, more facts would also be helpful. An isolated incident
of retailer acquiescence in the purchase of a car by an unlicensed driver would
certainly not be enough to impose liability on the manufacturer, even though the
retailer should be liable to the pedestrian injured through the negligent driving of
the unlicensed motorist. On the other hand, if a certain dealership developed a
128. See Lytton, supra note 101, at 63.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. We have modified Professor Lytton's example slightly. In his hypothetical case, the stolen
car intentionally ran someone down. Id. Given the danger of capture, it seems unlikely that the driver
of such a car would do anything that would increase the risk of drawing attention. See Berko v. Freda,
412 A.2d 821, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) ("While it may be reasonably foreseeable that a car
thief will use a car negligently, it is hardly reasonably foreseeable that he will use it in an intentional
act which amounts to an assault."). As discussed further in the text, that Lytton's hypothetical might be
an example of a case where liability should not be imposed is not an argument for a blanket rule against
liability in the auto cases.
132. See, e.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (imposing liability on a truck owner
whose agent left the truck unattended in a public alley with the key in the ignition, leading to a theft and
subsequent accident, which injured a pedestrian). This type of ease involves liability against the driver,
not the manufacturer. As this Article will argue, however, a case against the manufacturer might be built
from sufficiently strong evidence linking predictable theft from poorly designed locks to an increased
risk of subsequent accidental injury.
133. See Cornelius J. Peck, An Exercise Based Upon Empirical Data: LiabilityforHarm Caused
by Stolen Automobiles, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 909 (1969) (considering judge's conclusions and the issue
of civil liability in light of factual data concerning the theft rate of cars with keys left inside them and
the accident rate of such cars).
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reputation for selling cars to unlicensed drivers, a court should impose liability on
a manufacturer who continued to sell cars to that dealership." 4
The above cases, of course, are negligence suits brought by private plaintiffs.
Before considering their relevance to public nuisance law, let us consider one
additional, and purposefully outrageous, hypothetical situation ("Case 3") involving
car sales. Dealer exclusively sells sport utility vehicles ("SUVs"). Over the past
two years, SUVs sold by Dealer have been involved in approximately fifty cases
of intentional rundowns of members of competing gangs. Nonetheless, members
of those gangs continue to purchase SUVs from Dealer. Sometimes these
purchasers even make statements indicating their intention to use the vehicles as
instruments of homicide. Absent legislative intervention, the proper approach by
Dealer and its manufacturer is difficult to determine, but some observations can be
made. First, when a prospective purchaser announces an intention to criminally
misuse the vehicle, the Dealer should be armed with a privilege not to sell the car.
When the prospective purchaser makes no such statement, we might nonetheless
want to impose a duty on the Dealer to contact law-enforcement authorities to assist
in determining a course of action that would both respect the rights of the purchaser
and protect the public. In either case, surely the manufacturer who does nothing
should be at peril of liability. Depending on the level of complicity in such criminal
activity by Dealer, the manufacturer might investigate, impose supervisory
conditions on the Dealer, or terminate relations with the Dealer altogether.
The three situations presented above all involve conduct that, to one degree or
another, evades at least the spirit of the law. Such conduct both grounds the tort suit
by the injured party and creates the public nuisance because the otherwise lawful
product is being used in a way that poses a substantial and unwarranted threat to
public health and safety. Public nuisance law, as an exercise of the police power,
implements the state's obligation to protect its citizens from just such threats.
C. Applying Public Nuisance to Gun Sales
As the three aforementioned cases show, it may be difficult to determine
whether given conduct amounts to a public nuisance. That difficulty, however, is
no excuse for abandoning the effort to determine what is a public nuisance, in favor
of a blanket rule that since gun sales are so heavily regulated, the field of public
nuisance has been displaced. We will now revisit the automobile examples set forth
above, this time comparing them to analogous cases involving gun sales, to
determine whether, or under what circumstances, the supplemental regulation that
public nuisance law enacts would be justified.
Case 1, involving negligent design and related marketing, is the hardest case
among the three. For purposes of public nuisance, there do seem to be cases of
design decisions so likely to lead to criminal misuse that abatement might serve as
a useful supplement to regulation. Here the contrast between the gun and auto cases
may be pronounced. For example, the connection between lock-design decisions
134. See Rabin, supra note 127, at 442 (stating that when a defendant's negligence "enables" a
subsequent wrongful act, "defendant has affrmnatively enhanced the risk of harm, and as a consequence,
no special relationship is required to establish responsibility").
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by auto manufacturers and criminal misuse may be difficult to establish. 5
However, a couple of gun-design decisions by manufacturers seem on their face to
spike the chances of criminal misuse, and to do so deliberately. Consider the case
of guns designed to be sold in pieces through catalogues and then assembled by the
end user, thereby avoiding, at least temporarily, the whole battery of laws relating
to the registration and sale of firearms.'36 Or, in a well-known case, Navegar
manufactured a gun designed and marketed to be "fingerprint-resistant."' 37
Although it is not impossible to imagine a law-abiding citizen seeking out such a
gun, it is certainly reasonable for the state to protect the public health and to further
law enforcement by suing in public nuisance to keep such guns out of the market,
because of the high likelihood that the gun will be used for a criminal purpose. If
the legislature decides, for some odd reason, that such guns are permissible to
market, it may protect them through legislation, supported by facts refuting the
common-sense conclusion that such weapons are designed specifically for criminal
misuse. Here, then, is a case where legislative silence should not be interpreted as
acquiescence.
Case 2, involving sales to unlicensed users of the product, should be analyzed
the same way, regardless of whether the product is a gun or an automobile. In either
case, a nuisance claim brought by the state against a retailer only seems appropriate
if the conduct amounts to more than an isolated incident. Given the greater danger
unlicensed gun owners impose, the state might be more likely to invoke nuisance
law in a case involving guns, but the decision is properly committed to the sound
exercise of executive discretion. In both cases, the desirability of invoking nuisance
law against manufacturers might well turn on whether the manufacturer knew, or
should have known, of a practice of selling the given product to unlicensed buyers.
In the face of such knowledge, it would be hard to argue that the manufacturer does
not contribute to the predictable misuse that follows.
At this point, one might be tempted to interpose an objection that the cause of
the injury is the criminal misuse of the gun, not the conduct of the manufacturer or
distributor or even of the retailer. Even if the public nuisance claim were a tort
action-which, again, it is not-this conclusion would be open to question, if not
incorrect. Sound tort principles support imposing liability against those who
negligently furnish dangerous instruments, including guns, to those likely to cause
135. Bear in mind, though, that the state is not required to show the same kind of causal
connection as would a private plaintiff. To prevail in an action for public nuisance, it should suffice to
show that auto theft presents a threat to public health, maybe because of the likelihood of resulting
personal injuries, or maybe for some less obvious reason-such as the diversion of police resources
from other concerns.
136. See Halberstam v. Daniel, No. 95-C3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that it is a jury
question whether manufacturer's marketing of a mail-order parts kit for a pistol amounted to negligent
marketing). For a thorough discussion of the case, see Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and
the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 681 (1998).
137. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999) (overturning dismissal of
suit). See generally Joi Gardner Pearson, Comment, Make It, Market It, and You May Have to Pay for
It: An Evaluation of Gun ManufacturerLiabilityfor the Criminal Use of Uniquely Dangerous Firearms
in Light of In re 101 California Street, 1997 BYU L. REV. 131 (1997) (discussing, thoroughly,
Navegar's marketing and design of guns targeted specifically to criminals).
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harm to others. 3 ' Even an intentional criminal misuse of a gun should not absolve
negligent sellers of liability because the responsibility entailed in selling a gun
should suffice to create a special relationship between the seller and the injured
party, and at least one court has so held.'39 But if the gun sellers' causation
argument is problematic in personal injury suits, it is simply without relevance in
a municipal action to abate a public nuisance. Liability is based on the creation of
a nuisance, which, as we have seen, is rooted in the gun sellers' actions that subvert
laws designed to minimize illegal gun violence. Once this nuisance is created, the
authority to abate it and to recover costs incurred in connection with that abatement
follows."'
Professor Halper put the matter succinctly:
It is no excuse.., to such liability that the potential for harm
inherent in an enterprise has been realized by the acts of strangers.
One may not for the sake of private interest create or benefit from
a condition which could threaten the public and then evade
liability when the threat becomes present through the acts of
others.'
4'
In the typical nuisance case involving the defendant's use of land, Halper's point
applies even when the defendant is wholly unaware of the condition that the
138. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that liability is imposed upon a seller who "knows
or has reason to know" that a purchaser, because of "youth, inexperience or otherwise" is apt to use a
dangerous instrument "in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself or others
whom the supplier should expect to... be endangered by its use." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 390 cmt. b (1979). This section was invoked by the court in Kalina v. Kmart Corp., No. CV-90-
2699205, 1993 WL 307630 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1993) to support the denial of the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, where plaintiff's decedent was shot by her estranged husband, who had
used a gun purchased at Kmart. A thorough discussion of the negligent entrustment point, and its
relation to prohibited gun sales, is found in Heatherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 F. Supp. 294, 301-
05 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd, 593 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1979). For a case involving an instrumentality other than
a "real" gun, see Goldhirsch v. Majewski, 87 F. Supp. 2d 272, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that it was
a question of fact whether paintball gun was a dangerous instrumentality in hands of a fifteen-year-old
when parents knew their son had the gun).
139. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Of course, in such a
case the proper plaintiff would be the injured party, not the municipality. But this observation only
underscores the point that the public nuisance claim is different in origin and goal from a tort claim.
140. See Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Ownership, Use, and
Causation (Part H), 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,044 (1987).
141. Id. at 10,045; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 824 cmt. b (1979) (stating that
liability under public nuisance is proper where "one person's acts set in motion a force or chain of
events resulting in [an] invasion"). This point was not appreciated by two of the courts that have
dismissed public nuisance claims against gun sellers. In Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000), the court stated that the public nuisance
claim improperly depended upon "the acts of third parties, i.e., criminals." Id. at 266. Further, the court
stated that "defendants have no duty to control the misconduct of third parties." Id. The court appears
to have confused proximate cause analysis under tort law with the requirements of a public nuisance
suit brought by a municipal entity. See also City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45-D02-9908-
CT-0035 (Ind. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2001) (order granting motion to dismiss) ("to be liable for a public
nuisance, one must be in control of the offending item or activity at the time of the injury").
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defendant's land has created. The same is true in gun sales. Even if manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers were unaware of the deadly potential of selling to
unlicensed users, doing so regularly would amount to a nuisance. When such
knowledge may fairly be inferred, the threat to the public health is even more
apparent.
Case 3 is the simplest. It is easy to imagine why the state or municipality might
have a right to bring suit, either in criminal or civil law. If the Dealer sells to one
who announces an intention to use the car for a violent purpose, the proscription
against facilitating a crime would make prosecution proper.'42 If there were only a
strong statistical association between the Dealer's sales and the subsequent use of
those cars in violent crimes, a civil action to abate the nuisance would be proper.
The issue of how to abate this nuisance is difficult. Depending on the
circumstances,' 43 the court might order greater screening of buyers; law
enforcement surveillance; or, in the case of persistent non-compliance, shutting
down the dealership. Any costs incurred in pursuing this remedy might also be
recoverable.'44
In an analogous case involving gun sales-a buyer announcing the intention
to use the gun for illegal purposes-the nuisance claim might be easier. No unusual
facts need be imagined where guns are involved. Unlike automobiles, guns are sold
against a legal and social background that recognizes their frequent misuse and
consequent potential for criminally inflicted injury and death.'45 That recognition
has spurred the law requiring the registration of every gun purchase,'46 as well as
implied prohibitions against allowing straw purchases.'47 Other regulations vary
from state to state. 48 In a particularly egregious case involving dealer acquiescence
142. See MODELPENAL CODE § 242.4 (1980) ("A person commits an offense if he purposely aids
another to accomplish an unlawful object of a crime.").
143. One such circumstance would be the court's interpretation of constitutional constraints
restricting the right to purchase a car based on membership in a particular "gang." Absent evidence in
an individual case, singling out such a group for disparate treatment might prove constitutionally
troublesome. See generally Yoo, supra note 46 (discussing the constitutionality of anti-gang
injunctions).
144. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
145. See Lytton, supra note 101, at 63 n.305 (noting that the role of automobiles in violent crimes
has not been empirically studied and that the misuse of guns has been the subject of legislation in a way
that the misuse of automobiles, except in the case of drunk driving, has not been).
146. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33 (West 2000) (preempting local ordinance, yet permitting
counties to maintain waiting periods of up to, but not more than, three days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-
4c (West 1995) (mandating that the applicant for a handgun permit must not be subject to any statutory
disability, and must demonstrate that the appellant "is thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and
use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00
(MeKinney 2000) (setting forth licensure requirements including one of "good moral character" and
stating one county's requirement that applicants take a firearms safety course).
147. The term "straw purchase" refers to sales made to those legally entitled to own a gun, but
who buy the weapon for the intended use of another who is often, but not necessarily, not entitled
because of age or criminal record. See David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the
Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (2000). As
Professor Kairys points out, there is no specific federal law against such purchases, but federal
misrepresentation laws have sometimes been construed as applicable. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 922
(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(A), 1001 (1994)).
148. See supra Part IV.A.
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in, or outright encouragement of, illegal use, criminal sanctions would be
appropriate. 49 However, when the source of misconduct is elusive or when
authorities prefer the practical flexibility inherent in public nuisance, the civil
action may commend itself. As with the automobile case, the precise nature of
remedy sought will vary with the conduct. In the most intractable cases, an order
shutting down the business would be appropriate. In cases of less persistent or
serious violations, court-ordered supervision might be the answer. As to
manufacturers who remain willfully blind to persistent misconduct by retailers or
distributors with whom they deal, an injunction against further dealings with certain
retailers might be the necessary response.
V. REJECTING PRIVATE SUITS FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE: STRENGTHENING THE CASE
FOR PUBLIC SUITS
As noted earlier, private tort suits for public nuisance have been long
recognized and, in fact, sprang directly from public suits.'50 However, despite the
long history of this tort, it is time for its abandonment in personal injury cases."'
Absent an unwarranted change in the basic tenets of tort law, plaintiffs suffering
personal injury through gun use will gain nothing of value from the addition of a
public nuisance claim, nor should they. Further, such a claim has the potential to
cause unnecessary confusion. The contrast between public and private claims for
public nuisance emphasizes that the municipal claim for nuisance furthers the
legitimate interest of the state while the private suit for public nuisance is an ill-
fitting artifact.
First, recall that private suits for public nuisance require the plaintiff to show
an injury different in kind from that suffered by the general public.' 2 Interpreting
this requirement has proven difficult. For example, leukemia victims of
groundwater pollution were held to have stated a claim for public nuisance in one
case,'53 while plaintiffs claiming respiratory problems lost on a public nuisance
theory in another case because the problems affected everyone in town.'54 Even if
the distinction between these two situations seems plausible, what should be done
when some, but not all, have suffered the same kind of "special damage"? Professor
Spencer discusses a Canadian case in which fishermen sued for loss of livelihood
when the defendant's polluting of the water killed local fish. The court denied
recovery under a public nuisance theory because others had suffered the same
149. See supra note 70 (discussing Chicago "sting" operation).
150. See supra Part II.
151. Often the harm done to a plaintiff involves interference with her use and enjoyment of
property, not personal injury. Where property interests are implicated, a suit for private nuisance would
also lie. See supra Part II. Therefore, the tort of public nuisance is unnecessary regardless of the injury
claimed. Our discussion that follows in the text is concerned with personal injury suits only.
152. DOBBS, supra note 50, at 1337; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
153. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. Mass. 1986).
154. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Ct. App. 1971). On its
face, the Restatement (Second) of Torts seems to disagree with the result in cases such as Venuto:
"When the public nuisance causes personal injury to the plaintiff... the harm is normally different in
kind from that suffered by other members of the public and the tort action may be maintained."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. d (1979).
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loss.'55 But what if there had been only one fisherman in the area, or only ten?
Indeed, another court did permit recovery by fishermen under similar circumstances
without specifying either the number injured or how many would have been too
many.
56
Perhaps the difficulty in interpreting the requirement that the plaintiff suffer an
injury different from that of the general public would be tolerable if the public
nuisance suit for personal injury damages served a unique purpose, but it does not.
Despite some early confusion on the matter,'57 courts now seem to have settled on
the position that the personal injury plaintiff suing under public nuisance must
establish that the defendant was somehow at fault under tort rules independent of
nuisance. 158 The context of gun litigation is particularly apt for considering how
such tort rules might suggest recovery given particular facts. For example, a
negligence theory would be appropriate if negligent marketing or sale could be
shown; 9 or a nominally strict product liability theory might apply to a defectively
designed gun. 6' Even if courts permitted plaintiffs to proceed under a public
nuisance theory, the courts would not be likely to allow the plaintiffs to make an
"end run" around the liability rules established for each of the categories mentioned
above, nor should they, because the interest invaded is the same whatever the legal
theory employed.
One might object to the call to eliminate private suits for public nuisance while
simultaneously arguing for state suits based on the same theory. Inasmuch as both
cases involve the same conduct, why should the private plaintiff need to make an
155. Spencer, supra note 27, at 75 (discussing Hickey v. Elec. Reduction Co. of Canada, 21
D.L.R. (2d) 368 (1970), involving purely economic loss). As a general rule, plaintiffs in negligence
cases cannot recover for pure economic loss. In BarberLines A/S v. M/VDonau Mant, 764 F.2d 50 (1st
Cir. 1985), the court set forth the policy reasons undergirding the rule, and discussed the reach of and
justifications for the exceptions that have been recognized. By alleging nuisance, a plaintiff might be
able to avoid this stumbling block. Inasmuch as the cases filed against gun sellers by individual
plaintiffs involve personal injury, discussion of the economic loss rule is somewhat besides our
purposes. Nonetheless, it does seem preferable to address the issue of economic loss in a conceptually
unified way, rather than countenancing the presence of different and inconsistent rules based on the
formal tort pleaded.
156. Burgess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 249-50 (D. Me. 1973).
157. Spencer, supra note 27, at 75-76 (discussing highly specific categories of cases yielding
different results).
158. See, e.g., McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391 (N.Y. 1928); see also JOHN G.
FLEMING, THE LAv OF TORTS 427 (8th ed. 1992) ("MIn most situations there is no longer any liability
without some measure of fault.").
159. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
160. See Kelley v. RG. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153 n.10, 1154 (Md. 1985) (holding that
a cheap handgun known as a "Saturday night special" could be considered a defective product, when
an executive of the National Rifle Association, among others, testified in Congressional hearing that
the weapons "have no sporting purpose, ... are frequently poorly made, and... do not represent value
received to any purchaser"). Under a design-defect theory, liability is not truly strict, but is based on
a balancing of the product's risks and utilities. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRoDucrs LIABILITY
§ 2, cmt. a (1998) (noting that standards for determining whether a product is defectively designed, or
accompanied by inadequate warnings, "achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated
on negligence"). The Third Restatement also allows for the possibility of liability for designs that are
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independent showing of fault, which, as discussed above, results in the practical
collapse of her claim into other available torts, whereas the public authority need
not prove culpable conduct? 16' The simple answer is that the interests involved are
different. The state's public nuisance claim discharges its commitment to ensure the
health and safety of its populace, arguably the most basic reason for state
existence. 62 Protecting the interest of the public may require putting an end to, or
placing conditions upon, actions that are not otherwise considered culpable. While
generally the nuisance must be "an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public,"'63 a finding of unreasonableness may be based on a
determination that the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health or the public safety." 4 Thus, "unreasonableness" is defined not by reference
to the defendant's conduct, but with respect to the effect of that conduct.'65 The
unreasonableness requirement acknowledges that a risk-free society is neither
possible nor desirable. To use a familiar example, there could be very low speed
limits or a requirement that automobiles be designed to not exceed those speeds, if
the only goal were to reduce automobile accidents to zero.'66 Similarly, society
could adopt a "zero tolerance" policy toward pollutants, requiring their complete
elimination.
Instead, society regulates and manages dangers within agreed-upon tolerance
limits. When those limits are exceeded, the risks imposed become unreasonable.
Going beyond acceptable risks can be unintentional, as when a truck carrying toxic
waste overturns, even without negligence, or as may be the case with certain
practices relating to guns, intentional. In either case, the result is an unreasonable
threat to public health, and public nuisance is therefore the indicated treatment. In
each instance, unreasonableness stands out against a background of acceptable
risks, principally, but not exclusively, as defined through legislation and regulation.
The task of public nuisance law is to eliminate this excess risk and the danger it
poses to public health and safety.
Private plaintiffs in tort actions, by contrast, seek monetary damages for
injuries incurred. For compelling reasons, the transfer of money from defendant to
161. See Halper, supra note 31, at 10,292, 10,299 (noting that strict liability "applies categorically
only to public nuisance actions brought by the sovereign pursuant to the police power").
162. See Gostin et al., supra note 20, at 103-05.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
164. Id. § 821B(2)(a). Unreasonableness may also be based on a finding that the conduct at issue
is "proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation," or "is of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a
significant effect upon the public right." Id. § 821B(2)(b), (c). Only one clause in all of section 821B
has any reference to conduct ("knows or has reason to know"), but comment e to that section notes that
"[i]n the awarding of an injunction less weight may be placed on the aspect of knowledge." Id. § 821B
cmt. e. The tie between conduct and remedy is explored further infra Part VII.A.
165. The examples of gun seller conduct discussed throughout this Article and as alleged by the
municipal plaintiffs, do involve culpable conduct. As a practical matter, conduct that creates a public
nuisance generally involves a decision to avoid the law and thereby to render guns more dangerous than
contemplated by the legislature. However, as a theoretical matter, any conduct that in fact contributes
to such increased danger is the proper subject of a public nuisance suit.
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRoDuCrs LBBLrry § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("Society does
not benefit from [excessive safety]-for example, automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20
miles per hour-any more than it benefits from products that are too risky.").
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plaintiff is thought to require some culpable conduct by the defendant. 67 As noted
above, that conduct might be a single negligent act or voluntary participation in an
activity that is deemed "abnormally dangerous."'65 In either case, the defendant's
conduct results in an unjust gain, in money, in time saved, or otherwise, at the
plaintiff's expense. 69 Tort law seeks to achieve corrective justice by restoring the
ex ante holdings of the parties. 70 Thus, a plaintiff injured by culpable conduct has,
or should have, one or more theories of recovery available. However, when such
culpable conduct is absent, maximum respect for each person's freedom of action
counsels against recovery.' 7' To the extent that a private action for public nuisance
would cut against this principle by allowing recovery against a defendant who has
not acted culpably, it should be disfavored. At minimum, any such major change
in tort law should result from robust debate and should not be smuggled in through
artful pleading.
167. JuLEs L. COLEMAN, RisKs AND WRONGS 285-87 (1992); Judith Jarvis Thompson, Remarks
on Causation andLiability, 13 PHIL. &PUB. AFF. 101, 105-16(1984); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and
Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 408 (1987). But see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 151, 152-60 (1973) (arguing that defendant's causing harm to plaintiff is
enough, prima facie, to require the defendant to pay.) However, in a later work, Epstein acknowledged
that his theoretical argument for strict liability was flawed. Richard A. Epstein, Causation-in Context:
An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 653 (1987) (stating substantial agreement with Weinrib's critique
of his earlier work).
168. Indiana Harbor Belt RR. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990),
illustrates the line between private and public lawsuits. The Illinois Department of Environmental
Protection required the plaintiff to decontaminate its property, and the plaintiff sought to recover the
cost of doing so from the defendant, whose "flammable... highly toxic, and possibly carcinogenic"
chemical had spilled on plaintiffs land. Id. at 1175. Applying the factors used to determine whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous, set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520, the court held that
placing this chemical into a rail shipment that would pass through a major metropolitan area did not
give rise to strict liability and, therefore, remanded for a determination of whether the defendant had
acted negligently. Id. at 1176, 1183. If negligence could not be established, then the defendant would
not be liable, despite having created the dangerous condition. If, however, the State of Illinois had
brought a claim against that same defendant for public nuisance, that claim should have been proper,
even absent culpable conduct of any sort. Again, the state is charged with the responsibility of
protecting the public health, and ordering the defendant to clean up its mess would discharge that
responsibility.
169. The statement in the text has less intuitive plausibility in the case of so-called strict liability
actions than it does in negligence cases. One effort to make sense of the notion of compensation for
those injured by abnormally dangerous activities has been advanced by George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV L. REV. 537 (1972). Fletcher observed that strict liability tends to
be imposed for categories of activities in which the defendant imposes on the plaintiff "threats of harm
that exceed the level of risk to which all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares."
Id. at 547. Such "non-reciprocal" risk imposition can be seen as a form of culpable conduct, or, at
minimum, conduct that leads us to think it fair to require the defendant to pay for damages she has
caused.
170. Understandably, some have questioned the "fit" between money damages and the restoration
of equilibrium between the parties. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law,
77 IowA L. REv. 449, 457 (1992); George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 HARV L.
REV. 1658, 1668 (1993) (book review). For a response, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses
of Corrective Justice, 44 DuKE L.J. 277 (1994).
171. Thompson, supra note 167.
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VI. TESTING THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE LAW OF PUBLIC
NUISANCE
Given that municipalities are generally competent to bring public nuisance suits
to protect public health and safety, the practical question then presents itself: Do the
complaints that have been filed state a cause of action? 72 Answering this question
requires carefully matching the allegations against the requirements of law.
Reviewing the municipal complaints unearths a surprising diversity of
approaches to the public nuisance issue, and it is unnecessary to review all of the
two dozen or so actions filed to date. Instead, what follows is a division of the
complaints into rough categories, with reference to two different aspects of the
public nuisance claim.'73 First, we discuss the stated basis of the public nuisance
claim: What did the gun sellers allegedly do to create a public nuisance? Second,
we consider what might be called the style and support of the complaint: How is
it organized and presented? What factual support have the plaintiffs mustered in
support of their allegations? Our conclusions and observations are intended to
encourage courts to allow complaints that respect the mission of public nuisance
law to proceed, while providing incentives to state and local plaintiffs to seek,
where possible, amendments of nuisance counts that are insufficient.
A. The Bases of the Complaints
At the risk of oversimplification, the public nuisance claims can be divided into
three rough categories. The first is almost universal: Gun sellers have created and
supplied an illegal market in firearms. It is claimed that sellers contribute to types
of sales known to increase the likelihood of illegal gun use 17 4 such as straw
172. This analysis focuses on whether the public plaintiffs have properly stated a cause of action
in public nuisance, keeping in mind that most jurisdictions have followed the lead of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in requiring simplified "notice pleading." See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring, inter
alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'). In Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) the U.S. Supreme Court construed Rule 8(a) to require only notice
pleading, stating that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief." Numerous state courts have expressly adopted the federal notice pleading standard. See, e.g.,
Bethel v. Thorn, 757 So. 2d 1154, 1157 (Ala. 1999); Hamilton v. Greenleaf, 677 A.2d 525, 527 (Me.
1996); State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey County Bd. of Comm'rs, 605 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1992).
For the most part, we do not address whether municipalities would be able to withstand a summary
judgment motion to dismiss their public nuisance claims. The result of such a motion would depend
upon the ability of an individual municipality to demonstrate sufficient evidence to raise questions of
fhct regarding the nuisance claimed. But a well pleaded public nuisance claim with the factual
information to support it would greatly enhance-if not ensure-the ability of the municipality to
withstand a summary judgment motion.
173. Virtually all of the complaints allege public nuisance, even if the complaint had to be
amended to add that claim. See City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99VS0149217J (State
Ct. of Fulton County filed Feb. 4, 1999, amended, Sept. 15, 1999).
174. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson, Inc., No. CV99-036-1279 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27,
1999); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 7, 1998). The
word "contribute" in the text of the Article signifies that the defendant's role will differ, depending on
its position in the sales chain. Manufacturer and distributor "contribution" take the form of actual or
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purchases, multiple purchases, and "kitchen table" sales. 75 These allegations should
also be understood against a backdrop of specific gun-control laws. Thus, in a
jurisdiction with strict handgun laws, such as Chicago, the complaints allege that
manufacturers have oversupplied surrounding areas with weapons that then make
their way into the city.176 In other jurisdictions, the illegality is tied to the
predictable criminal use of an otherwise lawful firearm.177
A few cities have also claimed that a public nuisance arises from the negligent
design of certain guns or from failure to warn of their risks. Chicago claims that
some manufacturers design and sell types of guns known to be attractive to
criminals, 171 while Boston, Cleveland, and Gary, Indiana, complain that guns lack
safety devices, thereby rendering them unnecessarily dangerous.
179
Finally, Boston and Gary add the related claim that guns are deceptively
marketed to people who, it must be inferred, might not purchase them if in
possession of accurate information. For example, these cities challenge the claim
that gun ownership increases safety in the home, citing empirical studies to the
contrary.
180
Of the three categories discussed above, the first most closely fits the goals of
public nuisance. To the extent that gun manufacturers have actual or constructive
knowledge that the weapons they produce and sell are being used to fuel an illegal,
secondary market, and the manufacturers take no remedial action, they contribute
to the evasion of laws designed to limit the dissemination and use of firearms.
Traces conducted by the ATF of guns used for illegal purposes, which find their
way back through the chain of sales to the manufacturer, may supply such
knowledge, as alleged by the State of New York in its complaint.' Distributors,
in supplying these same guns to retailers, might have more specific knowledge of
which retailers were most often involved in illegal sales and are also involved in
ATF traces. 182 Retailers, who have the most specific knowledge of particular illicit
gun sales and use, should also be amenable to suit where, as in the instances alleged
constructive knowledge of sales, while, as detailed throughout the Chicago complaint, dealer
"contribution" is direct, through actual sales. Complaint, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596).
175. "Kitchen-table" dealers are those who have no store, but are nonetheless licensed to sell
guns. Of the hundreds of thousands of gun dealers, only a "very small proportion... actually have a
store." David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CoNN. L.
REv. 1163, 1169 (2000). For a discussion of straw purchasers, see supra note 147.
176. Complaint, at 1, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596) ("[D]efendants' conduct undermines
the City's efforts to protect the public health, safety and welfare through stringent gun control
ordinances which make it illegal to possess most types of guns in the City.").
177. This allegation appears in virtually every complaint. See, e.g., Complaint 5, James v.
Arcadia Machine & Tool, No. ESX-L-6059-99 (Essex County Ct. filed June 9, 1999); Complaint 50,
City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-2590-C (Mass. Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999).
178. Complaint % 60-62, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596).
179. Complaint 71, City of Boston (SUCV1999-02590-C); Complaint 84, White v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., No. 1:99 CV 1134 (Ohio Ct. Coin. P1. filed April 8, 1999); Complaint 72, City of Gary
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45-DO2-9908-CT-00355 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 27, 1999).
180. Complaint 72, City of Boston (No. SUCV1999-02590-C); Complaint 73, City of Gary
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45-D05-005-CT-243 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 27, 1999).
181. Complaint 3-6, 37-46, New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586/2000 (N.Y. Sup.
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in the Chicago complaint, they disregard their duty to sell guns responsibly.' 3 Of
course, the relief ordered will vary depending on the class of entity involved, but
the common "theme" of these allegations is sound under public nuisance doctrine:
Willful subversion of the law increases gun violence and, therefore, amounts to an
offense to public health and safety.
Unlike these potentially strong claims of fueling an illicit market, the design
defect claims must be carefully parsed to determine whether they amount to second-
guessing of legislative choices. Thus, the omission of safety locks, while it may be
the proper subject of a design defect claim by a personal injury plaintiff, should be
approached warily in the context of public nuisance litigation." 4 For presumably
sound reasons, neither states nor the federal government require safety locks. It may
be that, as some have argued, safety locks prevent guns from being discharged
quickly when needed for self-defense purposes.'85 On the other hand, allegations
of sales of guns designed specifically to appeal to criminals, such as the now
infamous "fingerprint-resistant gun ' or guns sold in parts to be assembled by the
buyer,"'87 are a different matter. Such actions plainly evade legislative action and
pose a clear threat to the public health with no apparent compensating gain.'88 One
advantage of public nuisance law is that it permits the state, or the state's designate,
to exercise abatement power without a specific demonstration that the defendant's
marketing practices were intentionally designed to appeal to criminals-the effect
of these practices should suffice.
A similar conflict in the empirical evidence suggests that the claims grounded
in marketing and promotion decisions be approached with caution. That said, the
empirical evidence at times overwhelmingly suggests misleading conduct on the
part of manufacturers. For example, the Boston complaint accuses manufacturers
of deceiving the public by advertising that guns in the home are "'insurance,' 'tip
183. Complaint IM 22-32, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596).
184. One might justifiably ask why a design defect tort claim brought by an injured party should
be permitted to proceed, while the public nuisance claim should not. The answer is that the conscious
decision of a rationally acting legislative body not to impose a particular requirement should be given
deference by a coordinate state actor, such as the state attorney general. This deference should be at its
apogee when there is a record that the legislature considered, but rejected, passing a law that would have
done what the executive now seeks to achieve through litigation. Private tort claims, on the other hand,
have long been acknowledged to have an incidental regulatory effect. Whether viewed through the lens
of corrective justice or the law and economics imperative of internalization of costs, such an effect may
be necessary to achieve the two central goals of tort law: compensation and deterrence. Further, a
public plaintiff that brought suit under a product liability theory would face the additional difficulty of
showing that it was the ultimate user or consumer of the product, as required for product defect claims.
185. See Lytton, supra note 101, at 20 (citing Jonathan Lowy, Litigating Gun Violence Cases:
Liability for Design Defects, at 8 (unpublished paper, on file with Author)). If safety locks do inhibit
the use of a gun for self-defense purposes, it could still be argued that a warning should be given about
the consequences of not having such a lock, among other risks imposed by guns. See Complaint 62,
City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. SUCV1999-02590-C (Mass. Super. Ct. filed June 3,
1999).
186. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
187. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
188. If there is some good to such design, it would be open to the seller to so demonstrate. But
prima facie the allegations should be sufficient to allow the public entity to proceed with the claim.
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the odds in your favor,' [are] 'your safest choice for personal protection,' and
[enable one to] 'have a good night."" 89 These claims may be proven false by data
demonstrating that guns in the home pose a danger, not a benefit. 90 However, the
data may undercount the instances in which guns provide effective self-defense
without being fired.' 9 Again, where the conduct of the seller is not intended to
evade regulation, courts should be wary. That does not mean, however, that claims
should not be permitted to proceed. If facts suggested, for example, that
manufacturers themselves either knew or believed that guns in the home posed a
threat rather than a benefit but continued to tout their safety, the public entity's
nuisance suit might sensibly seek an injunction against further advertisements to the
contrary. Similarly, if the data were not capable of reasonable interpretation in
support of the manufacturers' position, a court would be justified in allowing the
public nuisance claim to proceed, in recognition of the potential of such a suit to
remedy legislative inaction. 92
B. Stating a Proper Claim: The Viability of the Municipal Complaints
Determining which allegations are proper subjects of a public nuisance claim
is only the first step. Given the likelihood ofjudicial unfamiliarity with the subject
matter of these suits, public plaintiffs will increase their chances of surviving
motions to dismiss, and perhaps of ultimately prevailing, by structuring their
complaints to present their claims clearly and in a favorable light, and by offering
concrete facts that, if proven, would justify a public nuisance remedy. This section
considers, in alphabetical order, the ABC's of complaint style and substance:
Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago.
1. The Atlanta Complaint
The public nuisance count in Atlanta's complaint is incomplete and difficult
to piece together, and therefore unlikely to commend itself to the court. Part of the
problem is that the public nuisance complaint was added by amendment. 93 The
amendment begins with the public nuisance claim, which incorporates by reference
the original complaint." 4 That complaint, in turn, focuses the energy of its General
Allegations on issues of defective design and failure to warn. 95 As discussed
189. Complaint 63, City ofBoston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. SUCV1999-02590-C (Mass.
Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999).
190. Id. 64 (summarizing data that shows guns in the home are far more likely to kill or injure
someone in the home than an intruder; "for every time a gun in the home was used in a self-defense or
legally justifiable shooting, there were four unintentional shootings, seven criminal assaults or
homicides, and eleven attempted or completed suicides").
191. See COOK& LUDwIG, supra note 99, at 8.
192. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
193. City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99VS0149217J (State Ct. of Fulton County
filed Feb. 4, 1999, amended, Sept. 15, 1999).
194. Amended complaint 104-113, City ofAtlanta (No. 99VS0149217J) (nuisance count).
195. Complaint 1 24-75, City of Atlanta (No. 99VS0149217J). Of course, marketing and
advertising issues necessarily surface as a means of selling these defective products. See id. 25, 28-
31, 33, 62, 64, 69.
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above, 96 such allegations are generally less powerful under a public nuisance
theory than marketing issues. Perhaps aware of that problem, the public nuisance
count makes no mention of these initial allegations, instead impugning the
manufacturers' conduct in the marketing and distribution of guns. However, neither
the General Allegations nor the public nuisance count detail such conduct, thus
rendering the claim conclusory. After noting that Atlanta citizens have a "right to
be free from conduct that creates an unreasonable infringement upon the public
health, safety and welfare,"'" the complaint states, in substance, that defendants sell
firearms to persons whom they "should know will bring [them] into Atlanta,
causing these firearms to be possessed and used in Atlanta illegally."'98 A claim for
negligent marketing and distribution is another new count in the amended
complaint,1 but it follows the public nuisance claim and is therefore not
incorporated by reference therein. Further, neither claim provides anything beyond
general statements-not one defendant is cited for any specific act. The court might
well find such a complaint insufficient given the need to show the gun seller's
purposeful evasion of applicable law.
2. The Boston Complaint
Boston's complaint presents a more user-friendly face. The complaint begins
with a narrative discussing the ways in which gun sellers create and encourage the
illicit secondary market in illegal weapons." ° The section reads like a well-crafted
opening argument, establishing a background against which a court can then
consider the more specific allegations that follow. Paragraphs 41-67 feature a mix
of national and local facts and statistics supporting the conclusion that gun sellers
knowingly contribute to the proliferation of illegal guns in the United States. One
reading the complaint might question how well the local data have been integrated
into the national statistics that form the thread of this section, but the connection is
made explicit in several paragraphs of the complaint.2"' These facts are followed by
the Public Nuisance count, which uses them to reach the conclusion that this illegal
secondary market, as well as the defective design of guns and misleading
advertising practices, "has created and maintained a public nuisance in the City of
Boston." Public health gives this conclusion heft, as "the Boston Public Health
Commission... has declared that guns manufactured by defendants and found on
the streets of Boston are a public health nuisance."2 3
Unless the court simply decides that public nuisance law cannot apply to the
sale of guns under any circumstances, Boston's complaint is, and should be, likely
196. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
197. Amended complaint 1 105, City of Atlanta (No. 99VS0149217J).
198. Id. 1 106; see also id. 1 107, 109 (adding nothing of substance to allegations).
199. IM 1132-36.
200. Complaint § A, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. SUCV1999-02590-C (Mass.
Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999).
201. See id. I146 (discussing percentages of guns possessed by juveniles), 47 (discussing the
short time between retail sale and criminal misuse), 48e. (discussing the percentage of guns used in
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to survive a motion to dismiss. The allegations are stated with sufficient specificity
as to be reasonably capable of proof. One criticism of the complaint, however, is
that, with one exception,2" it does not tie any of its allegations to the conduct of
any particular defendant. Part of the problem is that the complaint names only
manufacturers and industry trade associations with particularity." 5 Retailers and
distributors are named only as Does 50-100 and 101-225, respectively."' As
discussed in the consideration of the Chicago complaint to follow, it is far more
difficult to pin specific bad practices on manufacturers and distributors than on
retailers, at least before discovery is conducted. Chicago's complaint also shows,
though, that Boston missed a chance to conduct pre-filing investigation against
particular retailers, which would have implicitly strengthened the complaint as a
whole. A court presented with numerous instances of outrageous retailer
misconduct will be, and should be, more likely to allow claims that distributors and
manufacturers participate in such illegality to survive. It is difficult to believe that
flagrant violations of law go unnoticed by those who supply the lawbreakers with
guns, and courts can be expected to permit factual development on that issue. The
invitation to do so is made more appealing by the single supporting fact that
Boston, as well as Chicago and numerous other cities, use relentlessly against the
manufacturers: a sworn statement by Robert Haas, former Senior Vice-President
of Marketing and Sales for Smith & Wesson. Haas states that both his company
"and the industry as a whole are fully aware of the extent of the criminal misuse of
handguns," yet "take no independent action to insure responsible distribution
practices."2 7
3. The Chicago Complaint
Finally, we turn to Chicago's complaint, which is grounded entirely in public
nuisance.20 8 Following sixty-six pages of detailed allegations, paragraphs 54-66
detail the legal claim. These detailed allegations set forth a multitude of specific
"bad acts" by defendants at every level of gun sales. The complaint alleges that
manufacturers know of, and contribute to, the illegal market by saturating the
market just outside of Chicago, which has strict laws prohibiting the possession of
204. See id. 52.
205. Id. M 4-34.
206. Complaint at 36, 37, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. SUCV1999-02590-C
(Mass. Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999).
207. Haas's statement is quoted in numerous complaints against gun manufacturers. See, e.g.,
Complaint 93, Ganim v. Smith & Wesson, Inc., No. CV99-036-1279 (Conn. Super Ct. filed Jan. 27,
1999); Complaint 48, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed
Nov. 12, 1998); Complaint 52, City of Boston (No. SUCV1999-02950-C); Complaint 87, Archer
v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912-658 NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999); Complaint 51, City of
Camden v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. L-451099 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. filed June 21, 1999);
Complaint 76, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A99-02369 (Ohio Cir. Ct. filed Apr.
28, 1999).
208. Interestingly, Chicago was also the first public entity to claim public nuisance. New York
State's complaint takes the same course of action, claiming only under a public nuisance theory.
Complaint % 63-64, New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586/2000 (statutory public nuisance
claim) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed June 26, 2000); id. 65-66 (common law public nuisance claim).
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most handguns."' Distributors sell to retailers whom they know to be involved in
illegal sales. 21" Dealers, as the complaint thoroughly sets forth, have engaged in a
variety of illegal sales practices, ranging from failing to complete the required
forms,2 ' to ignoring statements evincing intent to use the weapon for illegal
purposes,212 to failing to enforce the requirement of a valid identification card.
213
These facts against retailers were established through a "sting" operation carried out
by undercover police officers and other investigators before the complaint was
filed.
214
At the risk of overstating the point, if the actions alleged in the Chicago
complaint do not amount to a public nuisance, it is difficult to see how such a claim
could ever be stated.21 '5 As noted earlier, some of these retailers have been subjected
to criminal prosecution for their flagrant violations of gun-control laws.2 6 The
nuisance action can supplement these criminal proceedings, targeting derelict
businesses for remedies that respect the right of the public to be free from
unnecessary threats to its safety, health, and welfare.217 Chicago's complaint
followed an intensive investigation into practices that resulted in a flood of illegal
guns into the city, where it is illegal to possess them. As one of an array of
harrowing examples, the complaint details the criminal complicity of a retailer
209. Complaint ?T 1, 16, City of Chicago, (No. 98-CH-15596).
210. Id. 43.
211. Id. 27.
212. Id. 28 (undercover officer told clerk that he planned to "settle up with" whomever had
"ratted [him] out").
213. Id. 28.
214. Id. ? 27-28.
215. The well-pleaded nature of the complaint did not stop the Cook County court from
dismissing the complaint. See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (I1. Cir. Ct.
filed Nov. 12, 1998). However, the court's conclusion appears to be based on a misunderstanding of
public nuisance law. In fact, another judge in Cook County recently denied a motion to dismiss a public
nuisance claim in a private lawsuit against the firearms industry. See Todd Lighty & Robert Becker,
Families' Suit Against Gunmakers Can Proceed; Judge Allows Claim of Public Nuisance, Cm.
TRiBuNE, Feb. 15, 2001 at MCI. Given the conflict between the two holdings, the judge in the private
suit "signaled to the firearms industry that it could immediately take her ruling to the Illinois Appellate
Court, which is considering Chicago's appeal." Id. As of this writing, therefore, the status of public
nuisance law, as applied to the gun industry, is unsettled. As to the claims against the manufacturers and
distributors, the court in this suit brought by the City of Chicago grounded its decision on the lack of
"immediacy and proximity" of injury. Id. However, the court's causation concerns are more
appropriately raised in questioning a tort action, not one based on public nuisance. At the very least, the
causation requirements should be relaxed in a public nuisance claim, but that is not mentioned. As to
the claims against the dealers, the court's decision is even more perplexing. The court notes that the
complaint "asserts serious allegations of fact which suggest evasion and violation of applicable law."
1d4 Nonetheless, these allegations were also dismissed with only the following cryptic statement: "[N]o
showing has been made nor has an assertion... been made that applicable enforcement of criminal
sanctions have been attempted and, if attempted, have been shown to be inadequate." Id. Aside from
the fact that criminal prosecutions have been notoriously unsuccessful against "bad" dealers, see City
of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998), the complaint's
allegations, read fairly, are that the existing laws, even if enforced, are simply inadequate to deal with
the public nuisance presented by certain practices relating to the sale, distribution and marketing of
guns.
216. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
217. See Complaint 172-73, City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596) (detailing specific injunctive
relief necessary to abate the nuisance).
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known as B&H Sports, Ltd., located in the Chicago bedroom community of Oak
Lawn. For seven pages, the complaint describes a course of illegal conduct that
includes encouraging the buyer, an undercover agent, to lie about where he keeps
his guns; backdating and revising purchase orders; distracting a sheriff who was
asking questions; encouraging an illegal straw purchase; and, in response to an
officer's comment that he needed a weapon to "deal with" someone before he left
town ("get ... his ass"), advising purchase of a certain weapon that would "take
care of business." 8
Chicago's complaint then works hard to tie these and many similar actions to
the manufacturers' design decisions to make and market the very weapons that the
complaint earlier showed were used for criminal purposes (including the
fingerprint-resistant TEC-DC9) and to their steadfast denial of responsibility for
dealer's actions, including the much-used Haas statement. The complaint also links
these actions to deliberate decisions by both manufacturers and distributors to over-
supply high crime areas and areas just outside of Chicago. Of course, all of these
allegations demand proof, and the claims against the more remote sellers require
an inference that the dealer claims do not. This well-pleaded complaint makes a
sufficient allegation of public nuisance.
VII.FINDING CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPERATIVE AND A
REMEDY FOR GUN VIOLENCE
Most of the public complaints seek both damages for the costs associated with
the public nuisance and injunctive relief to abate the nuisance." 9 The damages
claims are perhaps irresistible, especially given the success states have enjoyed in
collecting the health-related costs of smoking from the tobacco industry.220 The
prospect of paying the costs associated with gun violence can also be expected to
push manufacturers and distributors toward settlement of the cases against them,
particularly since the gun industry is much smaller, and therefore financially
weaker, than the tobacco business. 2 ' On the other hand, equitable, injunctive relief
to abate the nuisance guns create may be less likely to have an in terrorem effect
against gun sellers, but is more specifically designed to carry out the cities'
responsibility to protect the public health and safety.
This subsection describes the relief sought in the various complaints and
considers whether such relief is appropriate under a public nuisance theory.
Equitable relief is, in principle, appropriate, and barring other deficiencies, courts
should allow such claims to proceed. However, to the extent that the suits seek
damages to recover the costs associated with gun violence, courts must tread more
carefully. Damage suits under a public nuisance theory are beset by both doctrinal
and practical problems that are difficult to solve. This subsection considers these
218. Id. 28.
219. But see sources cited supra note 24.
220. See Master Settlement Agreement, at <http'//www.naag.org/tobac/igmsa.rtf>; see also
GOSTIN, supra note 33, at 295-96 (summarizing principal provisions of settlement).
221. However, note that the tobacco industry faced an increasingly hostile constellation of state
laws, while the gun industry lobby appears to have succeeded in winning legislation, making city suits
more, not less, difficult.
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problems and suggests that courts would be justified in countenancing those
damage claims most associated with the costs of abating public nuisance, while
dismissing those that are not so associated.222
A. Relief to Enjoin or Abate the Nuisance
Inasmuch as the purpose of public nuisance law is to safeguard the public
health and safety, the equitable remedies of injunction and abatement commend
themselves as the most appropriate.2' Traditionally, in order to stanch the problem
at its source, the public plaintiff has sought just such remedies. As stated by the
California Supreme Court in Gallo v. Acuna,224 the action fulfills its "principal
office" of maintaining public order through "civil suits in equity to enjoin public
nuisances at the instance of public law officers." 25 Indeed, a criticism often raised
against tort actions-that the remedy, usually damages, is ill-matched to the
harm2. ---is inapt here because a properly crafted remedy will directly solve the
problem identified in the pleading. Thus, a pond breeding pestilence may be
ordered dredged; explosives stored in the middle of a populated area may be
ordered removed to a safer location; and helicopters creating excessive noise may
be ordered rerouted.227
The tricky part, of course, comes in crafting the appropriate remedy for public
nuisance. Courts will be better equipped to do so when the complaining public
authority has done the investigative work necessary to pinpoint the problem and has
tailored the request for relief accordingly. As seen earlier, the municipal complaints
against the gun sellers disclose varying levels of sophistication. The same range is
evident in the request for relief. Hampered by their own lack of specificity in
allegations, most of the complaints provide the court with only a nonspecific and
unenthusiastic invitation to abatement, requesting, for example, "abatement of the
public nuisance and an injunction restraining defendants from continuing the
conduct complained of herein.""8 Some provide a bit more guidance, 9 but, again,
Chicago's complaint sets the standard. In the fourth paragraph of the request for
relief, the City sets forth nine specific forms of injunctive relief needed "to abate
222. See supra note 11 (discussing the public versus proprietary issue); see supra note 24 (listing
the California Complaints).
223. See DOBBS, supra note 50, at 1334.
224. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
225. Id. at 603.
226. See sources cited supra note 170.
227. The first two examples are inspired by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b
(1979). The final example, and remedy, represents one author's wish fulfillment.
228. Complaint 94, City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 2000-CV-243 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. filed Apr. 11, 2000).
229. See, e.g., Complaint 161(f), James v. Arcadia Machine &Tool, No. ESX-L-6059-99 (Essex
Co. Ct. filed June 9, 1999) (requesting "appropriate injunctive relief to prohibit Defendants from
continuing to engage in the conduct alleged herein, including... prohibiting [them] from introducing
into commerce... firearms without adequate safety devices and warnings, and from distributing or
selling guns without appropriate and reasonable care.").
2001]
37
Culhane and Eggen: Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance Law in Municiple Suits
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the public nuisance caused by the defendants. '' 30 These requests, which are
informed by the investigative work of the city, are divided into several groups. One
group targets the dealers themselves, demanding that they cease various kinds of
illegal sales"l and be subjected to city monitoring to ensure compliance with the
injunction and relevant legislation. 2 A second group is directed against the
manufacturers and distributors and asks the court to require training, supervision,
and monitoring of dealers to boost the likelihood of compliance with the law (as
well as a requirement that those dealerships found uncooperative be terminated)233
and requests that manufacturers and distributors "participate in a court-ordered
study of lawful demand for firearms and . . . cease sales in excess of lawful
demand." 4 The remaining two requests seek changes in the design of the
weapons.' '5 As noted earlier, only those designs and related marketing decisions
specifically targeted for criminal misuse should be impeachable. 6
The lack of direct evidence relating to manufacturer conduct makes claims
against manufacturers more difficult. Given the "office" of public nuisance law,
however, a court may be more willing to resolve doubts on the evidence in favor
of the public plaintiff, at least where the relief sought requires only the kind of
reasonable supervision and training that should be taking place anyway. In short,
by focusing on the kind of injunctive relief designed to abate the nuisance, the cities
carry out their mission of protecting the health and safety of the public. Courts
should permit public plaintiffs to discharge their responsibilities.
Not surprisingly, however, most cities have devoted their attention to requests
for damages. Indeed, the equitable claim often has the appearance of an add-on,
inserted to provide the public nuisance claim with legitimacy. Thus, Chicago's
example is the better one to follow. Even if damages are found appropriate, public
nuisance law should focus on the kind of equitable relief that will abate the
nuisance. But to what extent is an award of damages proper in a public nuisance
suit?
Although the action for public nuisance is primarily concerned with arresting
the harm or threat to the public health and safety, courts have come to agree, despite
silence on the part of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that any costs that the
municipality incurs in abating the nuisance are compensable." 7 Thus, in Town of
230. Complaint 4, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed
Nov. 12, 1998).
231. Id. 4(a) (prohibiting gun sales to people who live in Chicago, unless they can prove they
have a place to maintain a gun outside of the City), 4(b) (prohibiting straw sales and sales indicating
the weapon will be used for illegal purposes), 4(c) (prohibiting sales to those who have purchased a
weapon within the past thirty days).
232. Id. 4(i).
233. Id. 4(d) & (e).
234. Complaint 4(g), City of Chicago (No. 98-CH-15596).
235. Id. 4(f) (requesting the cessation of shipment of firearms "that by their design are
unreasonably attractive to criminals"), 4(h) (requiring the marketing of "personalized firearms that
can only be used by the lawful purchaser").
236. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
237. United States v. Illinois Terminal R.R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(acknowledging the silence of the Restatement (Second) of Torts on the issue of recovering costs for
abatement, but noting that "[r]ecent federal court decisions reflect a growing recognition of suits by
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East Troy v. Soo Line Railroad Co.2 8 the plaintiff town was entitled to recover the
costs incurred in constructing a public water supply. The new system enabled
residents to avoid drinking water that had been contaminated by the defendant
railroad's toxic chemicals."29 Also consider City ofManchester v. National Gypsum
Co.,24 which provides the familiar example of asbestos removal. In City of
Manchester the city was permitted to recover the expenses of the costly removal of
the asbestos.
241
The above discussion begs important questions. First, why may the public
entity recover the costs it incurs in abating a nuisance? Recall that the principal
purpose of public nuisance law is to protect the public health and safety by
eliminating or restricting the nuisance. Therefore, an order requiring the creator of
the nuisance to cease operations is often the indicated solution. The defendant may
incur costs in doing so, but those costs are properly considered the responsibility
of the entity that created the nuisance.242 Often, however, the municipality itselfwill
be better positioned to abate the nuisance than the defendant. In that case, one
might say that the public entity incurs a cost that could properly have been assigned
to the defendant in the first place, so that the cost should be shifted back to that
same, responsible party. For example, in the Soo Line case the defendant could
have been ordered to abate the nuisance it created by contaminating the
groundwater. Instead, the town undertook the abatement because it was better able
government agencies under federal common law for the abatement of public nuisances"); see also City
of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983) (listing
abatement of public nuisance as one exception to rule that government may not recover the costs of its
services); Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1128 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding town
was obligated to act as it did "to alleviate a threat to the public health" and therefore may recover the
costs incurred in doing so); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1019
(7th Cir. 1979) (leaving open possibility of recovering for expenses incurred because of defendants'
discharge of toxic chemicals into sewer system).
238. 653 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1980).
239. The town was benefitted by an applicable Wisconsin statute that authorized an injured party
to bring an "action to recover damages or to abate a public nuisance from which injuries peculiar to the
complainant are suffered." Id. at 1127 (quoting Wis. Stats. § 823.01). The court read the requirement
of injury "peculiar to the complainant" broadly, authorizing recovery for costs in light of the "actual
present danger to the public health and welfare" that the town was obliged to end. Id. at 1131.
240. 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.RI. 1986).
241. We do not use the term "abating the nuisance" because the court in City ofManchester found
that a nuisance claim could not be maintained. The logic seems to have been that, because the defendant
was no longer in control of the asbestos and therefore could not carry out the removal program itself,
it was not liable under that theory. Id. at 656. This conclusion makes little sense. The issue of remedy
should be considered independently from the antecedent question of whether the defendant created a
nuisance. However, losing the nuisance claim posed no practical problem to the plaintiff. The court
found the defendant liable under a host of other theories, including product liability and liability for
abnormally dangerous activity. Id. at 657. The bottom line is that the defendant was made to pay to
abate the "nuisance" that it had caused.
242. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Ketter, 569 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary
judgment and thereby placing the cost of nuisance abatement on a property owner who received notice
of opportunity to abate the nuisance herself, but did not); Lydecker v. Eels, 3 N.Y.S. 323 (2d Dep't
1888) (holding that noncompliance with order compelling nuisance removal empowers local board of
health to abate nuisance and to charge the one maintaining the nuisance for the cost of doing so).
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to do so and then required the defendant to pay the costs it might have had to pay
in the first place.243
The next question is: What does it mean to "incur costs in abating a nuisance"?
In one of the leading cases supporting the notion of recovery of costs, Justice
Kennedy (then Judge Kennedy of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit) denied recovery for the costs of emergency services needed to evacuate
residents near the site of a toxic railcar spill,2' yet noted that a governmental entity
may recover the costs of its services incurred in abating a nuisance.24 But does
evacuating people from a dangerous area not honor the city's obligation to
safeguard the public health and welfare, just as would other remedial actions such
as dredging swamps, removing asbestos, or cleaning up the water supply? There are
two possible "short" answers to this question, but neither is wholly satisfactory.
First, the city of Flagstaff did not sue under a public nuisance theory, but for
negligence and liability for abnormally dangerous activities.246 Thus, one might
simply say that the plaintiff made an error in pleading. Assuming, then that the
plaintiff had added a public nuisance count to its complaint, would the result have
been different? The second "short" answer is still no because evacuating people
from the scene of an accident does not solve (or even work toward the solution of)
the nuisance itself. Thus, had the plaintiff asserted a claim to recover the costs of
cleaning up the spill-preferably under a public nuisance theory-that claim would
presumably have been permitted.
The second "short" answer, though, leaves two problems of its own. The first
is practical: Is it possible to determine whether a cost incurred truly works toward
abatement of the nuisance? Considering some of the claims for relief against gun
sellers in this light, it appears that, although difficult questions are presented, courts
are capable of determining which remedial actions further the goal of abating the
nuisance. This discussion leads to the second question: Should recovery under a
public nuisance theory be extended to all costs that a municipality incurs as the
243. One criticism of this view is that it does not seem to give the municipality any incentive to
act reasonably in spending what turns out to be the defendant's money. This problem can be eliminated,
or at least mitigated, by permitting the defendant to challenge the reasonableness of the expenses in
court. Given the practical difficulty of succeeding in such a suit, one might prefer a rule that requires
the defendant to initially abate the nuisance, thereby ensuring the proper incentive to do so at a
reasonable cost. The great practical advantages that will often attach to having the city abate the
nuisance itself must be weighed against this possibility. Such advantages seem to have been present in
Soo Line, where the inherent powers of the town, which included the ability to form a district and buy
land, enabled it to orchestrate the construction quite efficiently. Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R.
Co., 653 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1988).
244. City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1983).
245. Id. at 324. Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson are misleading in their discussion of
this case. See Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, MunicipalFirearms Litigation: Ill-Conceived
from Any Angle, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 1277 (2000). They note only the court's holding that costs were
unrecoverable under tort theories of negligence and liability for ultrahazardous activities, but never
mention the court's statement that such recovery would be proper under a public nuisance theory. Id.
at 1296. Their work is more in the style of brief than of scholarship, which is not surprising in light of
their disclosure that they "have extensively represented firearm manufacturers in a wide variety of
matters, including the defense of municipal lawsuits." Id. at 1277, n.*.
246. City ofFlagsaff, 719 F.2d at 323.
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result of a defendant's nuisance, even those that do not strictly contribute to abating
the nuisance? Given the purpose and history of public nuisance, those costs not
reasonably assignable to abating the nuisance should be disallowed. However, such
damages might be recoverable under tort law theories such as negligence or liability
for abnormally dangerous activities.247
B. Defining Nuisance Abatement in Municipal Gun Litigation
Most of the municipal complaints allege that the city or county has incurred
substantial costs in dealing with the effects of gun violence.2 a8 Although there
would be problems assigning a percentage of costs incurred to defendants' illegal
actions, it is reasonable to assume that at least some plaintiffs could convince a fact-
finder that some portion of emergency medical services, emergency room costs, and
other medical treatment costs are the responsibility of one or more of the
defendants. The same might also be said of the costs of investigating and
prosecuting violations of the applicable gun-control laws.
249
Requiring the defendants to pay these costs, however, would do nothing to
abate the nuisance. Indeed, even if the defendants were to assume all of these costs,
the nuisance could continue.25° By contrast, some of the steps suggested by Chicago
and other cities-enjoining illegal sales, requiring manufacturer and distributor
supervision of dealers, requiring participation in studies to determine lawful
demand for firearms, and authorizing the city to monitor compliance with the
injunctive relief ordered25"'-stand a reasonable chance of reducing the incidence
247. Tort recovery by municipal entities faces a separate host of problems, though, including
whether the plaintiff can claim status as an injured party, which is more likely where city property is
damaged or threatened by the nuisance, the general rule against recovery for economic loss, the
remoteness of the harm from the injury, and the practical problems of allocating a portion of costs
incurred to the defendant's wrongful conduct. See Raymond E. Gangarosa, Suits by Public Hospitals
to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Alcohol and
Tobacco, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 81 (1994) (addressing the above-mentioned points in a different
context); Public Nuisance Abatement, supra note 11, at 1527-31 (regarding suits by cities and other
municipal entities in their proprietary capacities). At least one court has been willing to entertain a claim
for pure economic loss in the gun litigation. City of Boston v. Smith& Wesson Corp., No. SUCV1999-
02590-C, slip op. at 19-22 (Super. Ct. Mass, July 13, 2000) (order granting motion to dismiss).
248. See, e.g., Complaint IN 85, 88, Sills v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-C-09-283-FSS (Del.
Super. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 1999) (order denying in part, and granting in part, motion to dismiss entered
Dec. 1, 2000); Complaint 194-92, District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 00-0000428 (D.C.
Super. Ct. filed Jan. 20, 2000); Complaint 74, City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45-DO5-
005-CT-243 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 27, 1999); Complaint 127, McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc.,
No. 99-73056 (E.D. Mich. Ct. filed July 15, 1999) (order grmiiting motion to dismiss as to Count V only
entered May 16, 2000).
249. See allegations cited supra note 240.
250. Of course, the nuisance might be abated if payment of these costs either drove the defendants
out of business or, less dramatically, forced them to implement the policies that the municipalities are
seeking through injunctive relief. However, these possibilities are too unpredictable and indirect to
commend adoption of a legal rule.
251. See Complaint I1 72-73, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH- 15596 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998); see also Complaint at 34, City of Gary (No. 45-D05-005-CT-243) (seeking
"preliminary and injunctive relief requiring defendants [tlo implement standards and training regarding
their own distribution of handguns, as well as the conduct of the gun dealers and distributors to whom
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of illegal gun violence. The result maybe that the gun sellers can efficiently assume
many of the costs involved. However, to the extent that the public entity
participates in achieving these goals, the costs it incurs in so doing should be
recoverable against the responsible defendants.
Given the points emphasized throughout this section, our conclusion that public
nuisance law is an inappropriate vehicle for the recovery of damages emerges
naturally. When the state, or its authorized actor, brings a public nuisance action,
it acts as a supplement to legislation, further implementing the responsibility of the
state to safeguard the public health and safety.2 Abating the nuisance discharges
this obligation most directly by eliminating, or reducing to acceptable limits, the
peril to public health. Actions for damages, on the other hand, compensate an
injured party for losses incurred through a defendant's wrongful conduct. In a given
case, a city may be able to show such a loss. The clearest case of such loss would
involve damages to the city's own property,253 but, in an appropriate case, a court
might also permit recovery for pure economic loss.
Even if recovery for economic loss is appropriate in municipal suits against gun
sellers, it should not be permitted under a public nuisance theory.2 4 As public
nuisance plaintiff, the city stands as defender of the populace, and the city's actions
should be aimed at eliminating the risk at its source. As a private plaintiff in a tort
action, the city seeks recovery for its own losses. The two should be kept separate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Public nuisance law has had a tortuous history. It has been both civil and
criminal, confused with private nuisance, and used to describe both a tort and an
exercise of the police power. No wonder, then, that its deployment in litigation
against gun sellers creates undue optimism in both private and public plaintiffs and
panic, often with accompanying derision, in the gun industry.
As this Article has shown, public nuisance law is indeed a powerful weapon,
and, under ancient and sound law, an appropriate means of calling to task gun
sellers whose actions threaten the health and safety of the public. Municipal entities
they distribute handguns, for the purpose of eliminating or substantially reducing the illegal secondary
market").
252. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
253. See Public Nuisance Abatement, supra note 11.
254. This point is insufficiently appreciated in Kairys, supra note 147, at 1178. While one court
that was uncomfortable with the rule against recovery for pure economic loss suggested that "public
nuisance law would be a good source of limits," Id. at 1178 n.10 (citing Dundee Cement Co. v.
Chemical Lab., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1172 n.4 (7th Cir. 1983)), this is not the same as saying that a
public nuisance claim can be stated simply by virtue of economic loss suffered. A public plaintiff might
recover for such loss under some other theory such as negligence, but public nuisance is the wrong
vehicle. Two important decisions permitting recovery for pure economic loss are J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) and People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d
107, 118 (N.J. 1985). However, these cases involved a limited class of particularly foreseeable
plaintiffs, and municipal plaintiffs might have difficulty obtaining such status. It is interesting to note
that the district court of New Jersey, while dismissing the public nuisance claim, nonetheless took an
expansive position on the issue of recovery of economic loss damages under a nuisance theory. Camden
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000) ("the
municipal cost rule does not bar damages in public nuisance actions").
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should continue to press, and courts should continue to permit, such suits to the
extent that they are directed toward furthering health and safety. The strongest cases
are those in which gun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers are shown to have
participated in the subversion of legislative will by facilitating an illicit market in
these deadly products.
At the same time, the very power of public nuisance law counsels against its
promiscuous use. Personal injury plaintiffs should not be permitted to use public
nuisance theory as an "end run" around the strictures imposed by other doctrines,
nor should municipalities be able to unleash it in order to recover costs. Respecting
the public health mission of public nuisance law is vital.
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